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THE SIREN SONGS OF SCIENCE: TOWARD A
TAXONOMY OF SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
FOR DECISIONMAKERS
Vern R. Walker*
"Come this way, honored Odysseus, great glory of the Achaians,
and stay your ship, so that you can listen here to our singing;
Over all the generous earth we know everything that happens."
-HOMER,

THE ODYSSEY'

I. INTRODUCTION

AS

the population increases, as natural resources decrease, and as
,-economic competition intensifies, it becomes ever more important
for private parties, regulatory agencies, and courts to make decisions
that are factually correct and efficient as well as effective. The ability
to make such decisions about public health, safety, and the environment, for example, often depends upon the best use of available scientific information. It is not surprising, therefore, that during the last several decades administrative agencies with scientific expertise have
multiplied and the areas regulated by those agencies have broadened.
Nor is it surprising that the courts have been inundated with scientific
information in both civil and criminal proceedings. Parties want to use
the most recent scientific advances to forecast the effects of decisions
upon their interests and to argue against decisions with adverse consequences. The sophistication of scientific methodology, the amount of
scientific information about the world, and the desire of parties to use
those methods and that information in legal decisionmaking all seem to
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law; Ph.D., University of Notre

Dame, 1975; J.D., Yale University, 1980. I wish to thank Bernard Jacob, James Hickey, Jr., Eric
Freedman, Gary Liberson, Norman Silber, and Wei-Yann Tsai for their comments on an early
draft of this Article. The ideas explored here were first presented in a preliminary form at the
interdisciplinary conference, "The Environment," Hofstra University. June 7-9, 1990.
1. HOMER. THE ODYSSEY, Book XII, lines 184-91 (R. Lattimore trans. 1967) (the Sirens' song
to Odysseus).
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be growing apace.
As the pressures increase to make more and better use of scientific
information, the legal profession, regulators, and the judiciary struggle
to assimilate scientific information into legal processes. It takes only a
few examples to suggest the breadth of that effort. Agencies, courts,
and commentators have tried to determine the effects of pharmaceuticals,2 pesticides, 3 and air emissions4 on public health. They have puzzled over the relevance of observed differences in group composition to
claims of illegal discrimination 5 and voting power dilution. 8 They have
2. See, e.g., Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 646 F.
Supp. 856 (D. Mass. 1986), affd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (in a Bendectin case involving
child with congenital birth defect, summary judgment for defendant drug manufacturer on issue
of causation was appropriate where plaintiffs' evidence consisted of reanalysis of epidemiological
studies, extrapolations from in vivo and in vitro animal studies, and studies of analogous chemical
structures); In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Products Liability Litigation, 624 F.
Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (providing extensive details of causation phase of bifurcated products liability action); United States Dept. of Health & Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Draft Guideline Patient Package Insert, Bendectin and Other Combination Drugs Containing Doxylamine and Vitamin B6 , 45 Fed. Reg. 80,740 (1980), withdrawn, 47 Fed. Reg.
39,249 (1982).
3. For example, see the controversies surrounding proof of causation of cancer by chlorinated
hydrocarbon pesticides and the waste byproducts of their manufacture. National Coalition
Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. EPA, 867 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that the EPA's
decision to settle with pesticide manufacturer for voluntary cancellation of pesticide registration,
but to allow continued use and sale of existing stocks of pesticide, was not arbitrary or capricious
in view of divergence of scientific opinion on risk to humans and lack of reliable data on environmental impact); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (analyzing numerous causation issues associated with exposure to chlorinated hydrocarbon wasteproducts
through contaminated groundwater); Dine v. Western Exterminating Co., Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) T 11,714 (D.D.C. 1988) (evidence that chlordane used as termiticide was carcinogenic and
that airborne concentrations could infiltrate treated structures presented sufficient evidence to
raise jury question whether product was defective under risk/utility test of defectiveness); Rabb v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 677 F. Supp. 424 (D.S.C. 1987) (plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient
likelihood of future disease from exposure to chlordane, where they could offer no testimony that
their increased risk of disease was greater than 50%).
4. See, e.g., Final Determination under Section 126 of the Clean Air Act (Interstate Pollution
Abatement), 49 Fed. Reg. 48,152 (EPA 1984), reviewed in New York v. United States EPA, 852
F.2d 574 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (denying petitions of Pennsylvania and Maine and remanding New
York's petition for submission of new data, after the states claimed that air emissions from midwestern states prevented petitioners from attaining and maintaining national ambient air quality
standards, impermissibly consumed a portion of petitioners' prevention of significant deterioration
increments, interfered with visibility in petitioning states, and caused acid rain; EPA found that
petitioners did not adequately demonstrate their claims of causation and injury).
5. E.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (employment discrimination); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (employment discrimination); Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (employment discrimination); Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482 (1977) (discrimination in grand jury selection). See generally Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM.
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wrestled with attempts to use advanced statistical modeling to help re-

solve economic disputes 7 and charges of unconstitutional imposition of

the death penalty.' Courts are repeatedly confronted with issues ranging from novel forensic evidence of identification" to epidemiological
evidence of causation.10 Legal theorists have tried to determine how to
improve the accuracy of verdicts,' how to integrate quantitative information with more traditional qualitative evidence,1 2 and how to underL. REV. 737 (1980) [hereinafter Regression Studies); Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical
Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARv. L REV, 338 (1966) [hereinafter
Statistical Decision Theory].
6. See, e.g., Campos v. City of Baytown, Tex., 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3213 (1989) (using regression analysis to determine correlation between percentage of
minority voters in population and vote for minority candidates as evidence of political cohesiveness
of minority for purposes of § 2 of Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended).
7. See, e.g., Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings.86 HARv. L REV.
1442 (1973) (discussing the types of regulatory proceedings in which regression analysis has been
used as economic evidence); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings. 80 COLIu ?, L
REv. 702 (1980) (discussing effect of cable television licensing upon revenues and growth of
broadcast television stations, and antitrust damages in price-fixing cases). An illustrative use of
regression models to determine economic effects is provided by Spiller, The Differential Impact of
Airline Regulation on Individual Firms and Markets: An EmpiricalAnalysis. 26 J L & EcoN,
655 (1983).
8. E.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd sub no"). McCleskey v.
Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (1Ith Cir. 1985), a.fd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (deciding relevance and probative value of statistical arguments that death penalty was imposed because of race).
9. For example, see the historical controversy surrounding the admissibility of voiceprint spectrographic evidence in criminal proceedings. E.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979) (admissible); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549
P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976) (not admissible on record in specific case): Cornett v. State,
450 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. 1983) (not admissible, but harmless error to admit); People v. Collins, 94
Misc. 2d 704, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (not admissible); Pope v. State, 756 S.W.2d 401
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (error in admitting evidence, if any, held harmless).
10. See, e.g., Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proofin Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORoDAM
L. REv. 732 (1984); Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence In Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARv. ENVT. L REv. 429 (1983): Hall & Silbergeld, Reappraising
Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARv. Ev'rL L REv. 441 (1983).
1I. See, e.g., Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion:Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory
in Evidence Law, 57 IND. Li. 1 (1982); Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasherand Other Stories, 1979 ARM. ST. LJ. 101 [hereinafter GatecrasherParadox];Kaye, The Laws of Probability
and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 34 (1979) [hereinafter Laws of Probability]:Kochler& Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L REv. 247 (1990). The foundational work on this
topic is the following historical interchange: Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1970) [hereinafter Identification Evidence]: Tribe,
Trial by Mathematics: Precisionand Ritual in the Legal Process. 84 HARv, L REv 1329 (1971)
[hereinafter Trial by Mathematics]; Finkelstein & Fairley, A Comment on 'Trial by Mathematics," 84 HARV. L. REv. 1801 (1971) [hereinafter Comment]; Tribe, A FurtherCritiqueof Mathematical Proof,84 HARV. L REv. 1810 (1971) [hereinafter Mathematical ProofJ.
12. See, e.g., Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L Rev 1065
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stand traditional legal doctrines within a scientific framework."3 The
problems encountered in such efforts vary tremendously-depending
upon the nature of the scientific methodology or information involved,
the policies and structure of the relevant substantive law, and the
objectives and constraints of the procedural rules, not to mention the
more elusive demands of politics.
Throughout such efforts at assimilation, however, there runs at
least one common thread: the available scientific information upon
which a decision must be made is almost always a mixture of scientific
knowledge and scientific uncertainty. Regardless of the information or
methodology, there is potential for error. This is true whatever the relevant science, whether archeology or aeronautics, economics or engineering, pharmacology or toxicology or epidemiology. Achieving the
best social decisions requires not only understanding and using that
which we know, but also appreciating and weighing the extent of our
uncertainty.14
In making the best use of scientific information in legal decisionmaking, it is still true that the beginning of wisdom is knowing what it
is we do not know. 15 Although significant progress has been achieved
(1968); sources cited supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978); Callen, supra note 11; L. Cohen, Subjective Probabilityand the
Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 627 [hereinafter Subjective Probability]; L.
Cohen, The Logic of Proof, 1980 CRIM. L. REV. 91 [hereinafter Logic of Prooj]; N. Cohen,
Conceptualizing Proofand Calculating Probabilities:A Response to Professor Kaye, 73 CoRNELL L. Rev. 78 (1987); N. Cohen, Confidence in Probability:Burdens of Persuasionin a World
of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985) [hereinafter Confidence in Probability];
Identification Evidence, supra note 11; Kaplan, supra note 12; Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion,73 CORNELL L. REV. 54 (1987); Kaye, Is Proof
of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333 (1986); Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn, 1983, at 13. Kaye,
Paradoxes,Gedanken Experiments and The Burden of Proof-A Response to Dr. Cohen's Reply,
1981 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 635 [hereinafter Paradoxes];Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1456 (1979) [hereinafter Res Ipsa Loquitur]; Laws of Probability,
supra note 11; Gatecrasher Paradox,supra note 1i; Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless
Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (1976); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L, REv. 1021
(1977); Trial by Mathematics,supra note 11; Williams, The Mathematics of Proof,1979 CRINI,
L. REV. 297, 340.
14. Judge Bazelon has urged: "Finally, I would especially stress the need for an agency to
disclose the uncertainty that surrounds its determinations. And by uncertainty, I mean the
agency's ignorance as well as its quantitative estimates of error." Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View, 5 HARV. ENVTLt L. REv. 209, 212 (1981).
15. See PLATO. APOLOGY 21 (F. Church trans. 2d ed. 1956):
So when I [Socrates] went away, I thought to myself, "1 am wiser than this man: neither
of us knows anything that is really worth knowing, but he thinks that he has knowledge
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within isolated areas, efforts at making the best use of scientific infor-

mation have been hampered by the lack of a comprehensive understanding of the nature and structure of scientific uncertainty. There-

fore, my purpose in this Article is to provide a taxonomic scheme 6 for
classifying the different kinds of scientific uncertainty-that is, a
scheme for identifying the different kinds of potential error associated
with descriptive scientific information. 17 It is my intention that the classification scheme be general in scope: that the taxonomy cover all of
the important kinds of descriptive uncertainty, and that it apply to information from any of the physical, biological, and social sciences.18
Such a broad classification scheme should provide decisionmakers with
a foundation for understanding the nature of scientific information
generally.
In order to focus the discussion and make it concrete, this Article
discusses specific examples of scientific information. One example is the
assertion that exposure to the magnetic fields generated by an alternating current electric transmission line can cause childhood leukemia.' 9
when he has not, while I, having no knowledge, do not think that I have. I seem, at any
rate, to be a little wiser than he is on this point: I do not think that I know what I do not
know."

Id.
William Ruckelshaus, then Administrator of the EPA. stated in 1983:
Given the necessity of acting in the face of enormous scientific uncertainties, it is more
important than ever that our scientific analysis be rigorous and the quality of our data be
high. We must take great pains not to mislead people about the risks to their health. We
can help to avoid confusion be [sic] ensuring both the quality of our science and the
clarity of our language in explaining hazards.
Ruckelshaus, Science. Risk, and Public Policy, 221 SCIENCE 1026, 1027 (1983); see also Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,998 (EPA 1986) (decisionmakers
faced with determining carcinogenic risks should evaluate the level of uncertainty associated with
their assessments of potential population exposure, and take measures of such uncertainty into
account in order to achieve a clear understanding of the effect of this uncertainty on any final
quantitative risk estimate).
16. "Taxonomy" is "the systematic distinguishing, ordering, and naming of type groups within
a subject field." WEBSrER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2345 (P. Gove ed. 1976).
17. By "descriptive" scientific information. I mean those scientific statements that purport to
describe the world and how it works. Prescriptive or normative uncertainty is addressed briefly
infra note 227. Detailed exploration of prescriptive uncertainty, however, is left for another time.
18. 1 do not pretend to demonstrate in any rigorous way that my taxonomic scheme is complete, in the sense that all possible types of uncertainty are covered. What I do hope to accomplish, however, is an analysis of the most significant aspects of scientific methodology as it is
currently practiced and of the descriptive information commonly encountered by decisionmakers.
19. Whether this assertion is true is an important issue for regulators, just as it is for those
involved in civil litigation. See. e.g., Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Klein Indep. School Dist..
739 S.W.2d 508, 514-18 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (finding sufficient evidence on which jury could
have concluded that transmission lines near school posed a risk to children and that "uncertainty
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Of course, this Article is not concerned with whether such an assertion
is true. Rather, such examples are used to illustrate the logically distinct ways in which scientific assertions might be in error.
I discuss in this Article six kinds of descriptive uncertainty: (1)
conceptual, (2) measurement, (3) sampling, (4) modeling, (5) causal,
and (6) epistemic.20 As will become clear, this ordering tracks the following logical levels nested within scientific assertions: (1) the definition and choice of descriptive concepts or variables to be used as predicates; (2) the application of those concepts or variables to specific,
individual cases; (3) the generalization from specific, observed cases to
unobserved cases; (4) the prediction of one predicate or variable as a
mathematical function of other predicates or variables; (5) the inference from certain mathematical functions between variables to conclusions about causal relationships; and (6) the choice of interpretations
for fundamental, logical concepts used throughout levels (1) to (5). In
this Article, I address each level and each type of uncertainty in turn,
suggesting how each is important to social decisionmaking, and illustrating how scientists try to reduce each type and how they express or
characterize any residual uncertainty.
Before beginning this detailed analysis, a few general remarks are
in order about why these six types of descriptive uncertainty are logically distinct categories. First, distinct scientific activities give rise to
each type of error. For example, generating data through observing and
measuring particular instances is an activity different from generalizing
beyond those observations, or from positing a causal system that explains those observations. As we will see, conceptual uncertainty and
measurement uncertainty can attend any particular observation, 21 but
sampling uncertainty arises only with generalization 22 and causal unover the magnitude of that risk should dictate caution"); EPA, Workshop Review Draft, Evaluation of the Potential Carcinogenicity of Electromagnetic Fields (1990) (Doc. No. EPA 600/6-90/
005A) (circulated for comment on technical accuracy and policy implications).
20. The potential for computational error is not discussed as a separate category for several
reasons. First, computational uncertainty pervades many of the categories of uncertainty. Moreover, the risk of computational error is widely appreciated, the means of avoiding it are generally
understood, and this kind of error presents few conceptual puzzles for decisionmaking. It should
be clear without further elaboration that most scientific information carries with it the potential
for computational error.
There are similar reasons for not discussing other kinds of purely human error, or deliberately
produced error (intentional fraud), as separate categories of scientific error. The potential for such
errors occurs in science, as elsewhere.
21. See infra Sections II and Ill.
22. See infra Section IV.
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certainty only with explanation.13 A scientific description of a particular object, therefore, might involve only conceptual and measurement
uncertainty, while a causal assertion typically involves all six kinds. As
a result, a simple causal assertion can serve throughout this Article as
an example of descriptive scientific information. 4
A second reason that the six categories are distinguishable is that

scientists employ different techniques to reduce each different kind of
uncertainty. For example, increasing the number of observations or
drawing a stratified random sample can reduce sampling error, 201 while
other control techniques reduce causal uncertainty. 20 Finally, the categories are distinguishable because scientists typically use different ways
to measure, characterize, or communicate the extent of residual uncertainty in each category-that is, the uncertainty that remains even after efforts have been made to reduce the potential for error. 7
My objective in this Article is a broad one: to provide a conceptual
overview of the kinds of uncertainty associated with any descriptive scientific information. Such an overview should prove fruitful to decisionmakers and legal theorists as they continue to explore the ways in
which particular decisionmaking processes can be improved. 25 This
analysis should also help decisionmakers to understand, in a comprehensive way, the descriptive science upon which their decisions rest. It
is my hope that such a broad understanding will lead decisionmakers to
23. See infra Section VI.
24. 1 do not want to suggest, however, that this Article is simply about causation. My objective is to catalog the kinds of uncertainty that can be associated with any descriptive assertion.
including causal assertions.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 108-11.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 186-98.
27. The six categories of uncertainty are also distinct because they can combine in different
ways to produce different aggregate uncertainties. Cf. J. CoHtRSSEN & V. COVELLO. RIsK ANALYSIS: A GUIDE TO PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOR ANALYZING HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL
RISKS 94 (United States Council on Environmental Quality 1989) ("uncertainties accumulate
rapidly in a risk assessment"; uncertainty in the variable of failure rate for particular plant equipment expands the uncertainty in estimates of exposed populations, which in turn contributes to
uncertainty in dose estimates and total uncertainty in the final risk estimate). This Article does
not provide a system for combining the different kinds of potential error into an aggregate measure. By providing an overview of the kinds of uncertainty significant to decisionmakers. however,
the taxonomy set forth here should serve as the foundation for a useful theory of aggregate
uncertainty.
28. This Article suggests different ways that decisionmakers might take the various kinds of
scientific uncertainty into account. A detailed analysis of this problem, however, would require
considering the substantive and procedural details of each regulatory or judicial task. A general
article such as this cannot provide a sufficiently detailed basis for adequately addressing any particular problem.
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approach the reduction of scientific uncertainty and the use of scientific
information in a wise and cost-effective manner.
II.

CONCEPTUAL UNCERTAINTY

The logical structure of any descriptive assertion, whether scientific or not, is predication: the subject of an assertion identifies what is
being discussed, and the predicate describes or characterizes what is
identified.29 For example, the assertion "That is a transmission line"
predicates the property of "being a transmission line" of an object that
is being pointed out by the speaker.30 The assertion "That transmission
line is generating a magnetic field" contains a further predication about
the object identified as a transmission line,31 as does "That transmission line caused this case of leukemia." 3 2 Generic information is also
predication. For example, the assertion "Electric current generates a
magnetic field" predicates of every electric current the property of creating a magnetic field.3 3 Predication, therefore, is the essential structure of descriptive information; the propositions about the world formed
by predication are either true or false.
Conceptual uncertainty, or the potential for conceptual error,
arises whenever predication occurs. Whenever a concept is used to de29. See C. LEwis & C. LANGFORD. SYMBOLIC LOGIC 263-67 (2d cd. 1959); Garver, Subject
and Predicate, in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 33 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). 1 do not
intend or need to claim, of course, that the only use of language is to describe things, or that all
utterances are either true or false. See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS passirn
(1962) (exploring the performative use of language).
30. In the symbolism of quantification logic, the logically significant components of the assertion can be represented by "T" (symbolizing the property of being a transmission line) and "a"
(denoting the particular physical object being identified). The proposition being asserted is then
symbolized as "Ta." See, e.g., I. CoPI, SYMBOLIC LOGIC 64-65 (4th ed. 1973).

31. The proposition asserted here is more complicated logically. It would be symbolized by
"Ta • Ma," where "M" represents the additional predicate "generating a magnetic field," and the
dot "." stands for the logical operation of conjunction ("and"). Id. at 8-9, 64-65.
32. The proposition asserted here is symbolized by "Ta - Lb - Cab," where "L" is the additional predicate "is a case of leukemia," "b"denotes the particular condition or instance asserted
to be leukemia, and the relational predicate "C" relates two subjects and stands for "is the cause
of." See id. at 112-14. The logical structure displays the three distinct elementary propositions
that are asserted with the single English sentence. The English sentence might be in error in one
of at least three ways: it might be false that this is a transmission line; it could be that this
medical condition is not leukemia; or it is possible that object "a" (the transmission line) is not
causally related to "b" (the case of illness). Such decomposition of English sentences into their
logical components is a familiar task to attorneys, especially litigators, even if the logical notation
is not familiar.
33. In logical notation, the proposition asserted would be rendered as "(x) ExDMx," which
can be read "for any thing x, if x is an electric current, then x is generating a magnetic field." See
1
id. at 64-68.
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scribe something, the use of certain concepts instead of others begins to
structure the way that we understand the object, event, or instance
under discussion. 4 Predication or conceptualization generates useful information about things, but it also can inhibit our ability to think about
those same things with concepts other than those selected. The concepts
actually used may not be the most fruitful or the best designed-either
for scientific purposes or for the purpose of making wise, fair, effective,
and efficient decisions.
A high-voltage transmission line, for example, may be studied
within a variety of scientific disciplines, with a corresponding variety of
conceptual frameworks. To a physicist, a transmission line is, among
other things, a source of electromagnetic fields, while to the behavioral
scientist it is a visual stimulus for a psychological reaction, perhaps an
object of fear or pride. To a utility company's electrical engineer responsible for the reliability of the bulk power supply system, the line is
conceptualized in terms of its capacity to transfer electrical energy reliably. To an epidemiologist, exposure to the magnetic fields generated
by the line might be a potential risk factor for childhood leukemia,
while to an economist, the line might be an investment. Restricting
consideration of a transmission line to certain scientific disciplines,
therefore, can influence the decisions made concerning that power
line. 5
In addition to conceptual alternatives between scientific disciplines,
differences often occur within the same scientific discipline. In most
fields, conceptual frameworks evolve over time.30 Some fields, such as
34.

1 assume that the subject of scientific predication may be any "thing": for example, a

physical object or group of such objects, a quality of an object, a theoretical entity or construct,
an event or situation. Cf. E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER. RELIABIUTY AND VALIDITY AssEsssIE,'T
10 (1979) (social scientists typically measure abstract phenomena. in addition to objects
events). The neutral term "instance" is sometimes used to denote any individual subject
predication.
35. An example of a judicial statutory interpretation relieving agencies of the legal need

or
9or
of
to

consider an entire field of scientific information is Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against
Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission was not required by the National Environmental Policy Act to

consider what effects restarting the Three Mile Island nuclear plant might have on the psychological health of those residents around the plant who were concerned over the risk of nuclear
accident.
36. See generally G. ALLEN. LIFE SCIENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1975): H. BUTTERFIELD. THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE 1300-1800 (1957); W. COLF.IAN. BIOLOGY IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY: PROBLEMS OF FORM. FUNCTION. AND TRANSFORATION (1971); T KUHN.
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); S. TOUI.N & J. GOODFIELD. TIrE ARCHITECTURE OF MATTER (1962).
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the various behavioral sciences, have been notorious for generating
competing conceptual frameworks at any given time. Scientific change
alters the way scientists think about the world, and it often involves
inventing, refining, or discarding the concepts used to describe that
world.
Scientists prefer to talk about variables rather than concepts, thus
focusing attention on the object being studied. A variable is a property
that varies from individual to individual. The "value" or "score" of the
variable can change from instance to instance (for example, height or
age). 37 Any descriptive predication can, in turn, be viewed as an assertion about the score or value of a variable in a particular instance. For
example, to assert that "That is a transmission line" is to score the
object referred to on the variable "being a transmission line": "yes" or
"no." Thus, any information-even the most qualitative-can be
viewed as the result of scoring or assessing instances with respect to
variables.
Thinking in terms of variables is more than simply a change of
nomenclature. Once the world, as seen through the eyes of the scientist,
is conceptualized as the object of scoring, then we can go further than
mere logical structure and can evaluate variables for their adequacy
from the standpoint of measurement. For example, variables should be
defined in such a way that every possible instance (object or event) has
some value for each variable. If some instances have no score, then
they are indeterminate with respect to that variable, and predications
of that variable cannot be determined to be either true or false. 38 The
scoring categories for a variable, therefore, must be exhaustive before
the variable can escape indeterminacy.39
37.

See. e.g., E.

HAVIORAL SCIENCES

GHISELLI, J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDECK, MEASUREMENT THEORY FOR TIlE BE9-10 (1981); H. LOETHER & D. McTAVISH. DESCRIPTIVE AND INFERENTIAL

STATISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION

14 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing measurement techniques employed

by sociologists).
38. This would be radical indeterminacy, not just a reflection of practical ignorance. Even if I
do not know the location of a particular transmission line, I know in principle how to resolve the
question. Such ignorance is simply a limitation in my factual knowledge, not a problem with the
definition of the variable "being a transmission line."
39. The value categories for a variable are "exhaustive" or "inclusive" if they are defined in
such a way that every instance fits into some category. E.g., H. LOETHER & D. MCTAVISH, supra
note 37, at 16; Reynolds, Nominal Data, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICAL SCIENCES 256 (S.

Kotz & N. Johnson ed. 1985). Thus, if the variable is color and the categories are defined as

"red" and "non-red," those categories are exhaustive. If, however, the categories were defined as
"red" and "blue," these two categories would not be exhaustive because yellow things could not be
classified. In order for a concept or variable to be well-defined, it must provide categories in which
to place every instance. See id.; H. LOETHER & D. McTAVISH, supra note 37, at 16.
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In addition to being exhaustive, the scoring categories of a variable
should be mutually exclusive: each instance should fit into only one
category.40 If the categories are not mutually exclusive (for example, if
an instance could go into either of two categories), results may be inconsistent or misleading.

So far, the illustrations of scientific concepts and variables have
been primarily qualitative or nominal,4" emphasizing that scientific in-

formation of any type can be thought of in terms of variables and measurement. Unlike the values of qualitative variables, those of quantitative variables are related to each other on a scale. The simplest level of
quantitative variable, the ordinal variable,'2 merely orders or ranks the
categories relative to an increase of the property under consideration.
For example, while the variable "carcinogenic to humans" might be
defined as a nominal variable (a chemical agent would be then re-

garded simply as either carcinogenic to humans or not),' 3 the variable
"hazardous to humans" might be defined as an ordinal variable ranking degrees of hazard ("low," "medium," and "high"). 44 Finally, scalar
40.

See H. LOETHER & D. McTAvISH, supra note 37, at 16; Reynolds, supra note 39, at 256.

With regard to the variable of color, the categories "yellow" and "non-red" are not mutually
exclusive because we can properly place a yellow object into either category.
41. Qualitative variables generate nominal data. There is no ranking or ordering among the
value categories. E.g., E. GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK. supra note 37, at 23-24; H.
LOaTHER & D. McTAVISH, supra note 37, at 16-17 (nominal variables in sociology include marital status, gender, and religious affiliation); Reynolds, supra note 39. at 256.
Dichotomous variables have two value categories. E.GHISELLU. J. CA.PaE. & S ZEDICK.
supra note 37, at 27-28. There is no theoretical limit, however, to the number of value categories
that can be used to define a variable, although there are practical and psychological reasons for
limiting the number. As long as the subcategories are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, multivalued variables can improve our ability to classify phenomena. For example, in a particular
study it might be useful to define the variable "color" as possessing only six categories: "red."
"yellow," "blue," "black," "white," and "other."
42. E.g., E. GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 12-13, 24; Agresti. Ordinal Data, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICAL SCIENCES 511 (S. Kotz & N. Johnson eds. 1985).
Unlike the quantitative scales used to define scalar quantitative variables, see Infra text accompanying note 45, ordinal scales order categories, but do not measure the degree or amount of the
property from category to category. See. e.g., E. GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note
37, at 12; H. LOETHER & D. McTAvISH, supra note 37, at 17 (giving example of social class
grading schemes as ordinal variables).
43. See, e.g., Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992. 33.994-96
(EPA 1986) (hazard identification part of risk assessment is qualitative assessment of "whether or
not an agent may pose a carcinogenic hazard"); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL RIsK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 19 (1983) (defining the "hazard
identification" step in risk assessment as the process of determining whether exposure to an agent
can cause an increase in the incidence of an adverse health effect-theoretically, a "yes-no"
question).
44. For an example of an ordinal variable in a regulatory context, see EPA Pesticide Labaling
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variables are quantitative variables whose categories are related by
some measure of incremental frequency, degree, or amount of the relevant property." For example, the variable "magnetic field strength" is
measured on a real-number scale, typically in gauss (G) or milligauss
(mG)." A three-milligauss field, therefore, has twice the strength of a
1.5-milligauss field.
Regardless of the type of variable employed, the most basic descriptive information provided by scientists to decisionmakers takes the
form of data, a collection of reports about observations or measurements of particular instances.17 But even such elementary items of scientific information come laden with conceptual uncertainty. The variables used might be badly defined because their categories are not
exhaustive or are not mutually exclusive. Variables might be defined
nominally, when ordinal or scalar definitions later prove more appropriate." Some variables might not be fruitful, or might lead to wrong
theories, and might be abandoned or modified later when new variables
are invented. The conceptual tools of the different scientific disciplines
are frequently in flux. The problem for decisionmakers is that, while
Requirements for Pesticides and Devices, 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(1) (1989) (defining Toxicity Categories I to IV for pesticide labeling purposes).
45. E. GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 12. It is common to classify
scalar variables as either interval variables or ratio variables, id. at 13-15; H. LOETtHER & D.
MCTAViSH, supra note 37, at 17-19, although this distinction is not of conceptual importance
here. Interval variables are those whose quantitative scales measure the intervals between subcategories by means of a standard unit of measurement, but which do not have a true zero value (a
subcategory for instances that do not possess the property identified by the variable at all). An
example is a psychological scale measuring arithmetic ability without testing for the total absence
of such ability. E. GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 14 (stating that "many
if not most psychological variables" are interval rather than ratio variables). The values of ratio
variables are related by unit intervals and include a true zero category as well. For example,
scales measuring length typically have true zero values, indicating the absence of length. Having a
true zero value allows measured individuals to be compared to each other in terms of possessing a
ratio (proportion or percentage) of the property. See id. at 13-14; H. LOETHER & D. McTAvIsti,
supra note 37, at 18-19 (giving examples of ratio variables in sociology, such as "size of family").
46. See. e.g., Scientific Advisory Panel, New York State Power Lines Project, Final Report on
Biological Effects of Power Line Fields 31 (1987).
47. H. LOETHER & D. MCTAVISH, supra note 37, at 15. Reports of individual observations are
sometimes legally important in themselves, for example, where an investigating scientist reports
the measurements of magnetic field strength under a particular transmission line. Such reports
can also form the basis for collective or statistical information, or provide support for a scientific
theory.
48. Distinguishing these types of variables becomes extremely important when statistical techniques are to be applied to data. Some techniques apply only to nominal data, ordinal data, or
scalar data. See id. at 220-65 (describing different measures of association for nominal, ordinal,
and interval variables).
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scientists go about their task of conceptualizing and classifying things
in ways that they hope will prove fruitful for scientific prediction and
explanation, litigating parties, courts, and agencies must make their decisions with the scientific information then at hand. 9
Courts often exhibit the reasonable, although conservative, ap-

proach of not accepting novel scientific conceptualizations until the associated theories have been reasonably well accepted by scientists."0

That threshold test of acceptance may be difficult both to define and to
apply. 51 Such an approach, however, comports with the entrenched disposition of scientists themselves not to adopt concepts or variables as
isolated items, but always to develop and define them within broader
conceptual systems. The broader the range of phenomena covered by
the theory, and the more coherent the inner logical connections of the
theory, the more confidence scientists have that the theory provides an

adequate representation of the real world. 2 Moreover, integration of a
concept or variable into a broad, established scientific theory might be
the only assurance a decisionmaker can receive that conceptual uncertainty is being kept to a minimum, given the current state of science.
An important but unresolved question is how to measure, or even
characterize, the residual conceptual uncertainty associated with scien49. Tribe has suggested that one consequence of increased reliance upon mathematical proof
in the trial setting "may be to shift the focus away from such elements as volition, knoa ledge, and
intent, and toward such elements as identity and occurrence-for the same reason that the hard
variables tend to swamp the soft." Trial by Mathematics.supra note II, at 1366. In other words,
increased reliance upon mathematically structured inference might influence our choice of which
variables to consider legally significant because ease of measurement would ease problems of
proof. Cf. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 117 ("Counting has invaded, indeed nearly
conquered, the social sciences.").
50. See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (rejecting novel
scientific evidence unless premised on a principle "sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs"); Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUt L REv 1197, 1205.
1207 (1980) (Frye test, which dominated admissibility of scientific evidence for more than half a
century, established a method for ensuring reliability of scientific evidence). Cf. FED R_EvID 703
("If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data [upon which an expert witness bases an opinion or
inference] need not be admissible in evidence."); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. WEINSTEIN's EviDENCE MANUAL 13.03[02][c] (1987) (under Rule 703, "the proponent of the expert must establish that experts other than the proposed [expert] witness would act upon the information relied
upon, and would do so for purposes other than testifying in a lawsuit").
51. See Giannelli, supra note 50, at 1208-31.
52. Other components of a complete scientific theory, besides the menu of concepts and variables associated with it, will be discussed throughout this Article, particularly in the sections dealing with measurement, modeling, and causal analysis. Scientific theories arc highly complicated
logical structures, not simply bundles of concepts or variables.
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tific information-the uncertainty that remains once efforts have been
made to reduce conceptual uncertainty as much as possible. Perhaps all
that is possible, at least at the present time, is to attempt to ensure that
all relevant scientific disciplines (and all viable theories within those
disciplines) are represented when decisions are deliberated. Doing so,
however, does not necessarily assist the decisionmaker in knowing how
best to integrate competing conceptual frameworks to arrive at a single
decision. Decisionmakers usually must accept the vastly splintered state
of scientific knowledge and must try to determine how to make decisions in the face of radical scientific pluralism. 3
III.

MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY

Once descriptive concepts and variables have been identified as potentially useful or appropriate, the "measurement process" introduces
another kind of scientific uncertainty. Measurement, in this general
sense, is the process of classifying or sorting things into the categories
of variables.54 More specifically, it is the process of determining the
value of a variable for a particular instance. Unaided visual inspection,
for example, might be the measurement method for sorting balls into
the categories of a nominal variable (for example, the variable "color":
"red," "blue," "yellow," and "other") or an ordinal variable (for example, the variable "size": "small," "medium," and "large"). Calipers can
measure the diameters of the balls in centimeters. A gas chromatograph can identify the presence or absence of certain chemical
compounds in samples (for example, the nominal variable "contains
chlordane": "yes," "no") or their quantity (for example, micrograms of
55
chlordane per sample).

Measurement, then, is a generic term for any process used to classify instances into the various categories of a variable, whether that
variable is qualitative or quantitative. Measurement uncertainty is the
53. For a discussion of the problem of optimal decisionmaking and scientific theories concerning decisionmaking itself, see infra note 227.
54. See, e.g., E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER, supra note 34, at 10; H. LOETHER & D. McTAVISn,
supra note 37, at 14. Some authors reserve the word "measurement" for use with quantitative
variables, and use "classification" for qualitative variables. See E. GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S,
ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 9. While this usage might conform better to ordinary usage, I use the
word "measurement" to underscore the logical similarities among all processes of sorting instances
into categories, regardless of the nature of the variable.
55. See generally Giuliany, Gas ChromatographicAnalysis in Water Pollution, in CHROMATOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 195-218 (R. Grob 2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter CHROMATOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENT];

Analysis in Soil Chemistry, in id., at 347-73.

Grob & Kanatharana, Gas Chromatographic
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potential for misclassification, for error in placing a particular instance
into the wrong category. Such uncertainty is logically distinct from
conceptual uncertainty, for the possibility of measurement error arises
only after a variable has been selected and the associated risk of conceptual uncertainty has been incurred."6
Depending upon the nature and extent of measurement error, misclassification can have legal significance in matters ranging from
rulemaking and regulatory enforcement proceedings to verdicts in civil
or criminal cases. The legal significance of any measurement uncertainty would vary with the substantive issues being decided, the allocation of the burden of producing evidence, and the degree of uncertainty
that can be tolerated in the legal decisionmaking.
Scientists normally evaluate a measurement method by assessing
its validity and its reliability. A measurement method is valid to the
degree that "it measures what it purports to measure."'5 7 If the measurement method introduces a bias or systematic error into the results
(systematic overestimate or underestimate), then to that extent the
measurement method lacks validity.58 However, even a valid measurement method might produce random error or noise around the true
amount.5 9 To the extent that there is such noise among different measurement scores of the same thing, the measurement technique is unreliable.6 0 The total measurement uncertainty is generally a combination
of the potential for error in these two dimensions: systematic error and
random error."1 These two aspects of measurement uncertainty will be
discussed individually, for they are two different sources of measure56. When a variable is not well defined, as when the criteria for category inclusion are vague,
the risk of misclassification may increase. Nevertheless, misclassification can occur even when the
variable is well defined in principle.
57. E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER, supra note 34, at 12; E. GHISELU. J. CAMPBELL & S, ZEDICK.
supra note 37, at 266; H. LoETHER & D. McTAvZSH, supra note 37, at 14, 32: see lmwinkelried,
A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of

Scientific Evidence, 23

M.& MARY L. REv. 261, 279 (1981) (in forensic science, a forensic

technique's validity depends upon the percentage of cases in which the analyst can make correct

determinations). The term "valid" is sometimes applied by extension to the measurement instrument used in the method, or to the measurement result itself.
58.

See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.

59. See infra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
60.

E.

CARMINES &

R.

ZELLER,

supra note 34, at 13; E. GHISELU. J.

CAMPBELL & S ZEDICK,

supra note 37, at 191; see lmwinkelried, supra note 57, at 279 (in forensic science, a forensic
technique's reliability depends upon the percentage of cases in which independent examiners of
the test results will make the same determination).
61. See sources cited infra note 62; Peters & Westgard, Evaluation of Afethods, in TExTaOOK
OF CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 410, 413 (N. Tietz ed. 1986).
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ment error.6 2
A.

Validity

A measurement method that produces systematic, nonrandom results measures something, even if we are mistaken about what we are
measuring. For a measurement method to be valid, therefore, we must
be correct in our interpretation of exactly what is being measured.
When a process actually measures one variable when we think it is
measuring another, the results are potentially informative, but we draw
our conclusions about the wrong thing. For example, if, in trying to sort
red balls from those of other colors, a person consistently selects blue
balls instead of red ones, that person's visual perception is not a valid
measurement method for redness (though it might be a valid method
for blueness).
Lack of validity also occurs when the method measures two variables at once, only one of which is the variable we think we are measuring. In such a case, the "interfering variable" produces a systematic
bias in the measurements. For example, if a person includes both orange and red balls in a group that is supposed to contain only red balls,
that person's results have a bias toward overestimating the number of
red balls.
Problems with measurement validity occur in every scientific area.
In the biophysical sciences, sophisticated measurement techniques often
raise questions concerning validity-as, for example, when clinical laboratory results are affected by intermediate chemical products. 3 In the
social sciences, where measurement instruments often take the form of
questionnaires or tests administered to people, problems of the proper
interpretation of scores often arise.6 4 Private or regulatory decisions can
62. See E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER, supra note 34, at 13-15; E. GHISELLI, J. CAMPBELL & S,
ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 187-90; Cameron, Error Analysis, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICAL
SCIENCES 545, 550 (S. Kotz & N. Johnson eds. 1982); Currie, Sources of Error and the Approach to Accuracy in Analytical Chemistry, in I TREATISE ON ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 95, 11922 (I. Kolthoff & P. Elving eds. 1978).
63. See Peters & Westgard, supra note 61, at 411-12 (example of glucose measurements being affected by hydrogen peroxide when a glucose oxidase reaction is employed).

Analytical specificity is another term used to refer to "the ability of an analytical method to
determine solely the component(s) it purports to measure." Id. at 411 (quoting Blttner, Borth,
Boutwell & Broughton, Provisional Recommendation on Quality Control in Clinical Chemistry,

22

CLINICAL CHEMISTRY

64.

538 (1976) [hereinafter Provisional Recommendation]).

The California F Scale, for example, may be interpreted as measuring two different

properties at the same time: adherence to authoritarian beliefs and the trait of tending to agree
with assertions. E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER, supra note 34, at 15.
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be significantly affected by bias in environmental measurements. 5 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, has denied petitions for relief from interstate air pollution under section 126 of the
Clean Air Act in part because the sulfate data of the petitioning states
were probably biased toward overestimating the amount of sulfate in
ambient air."6 In such examples, errors in the results are due in part to
lack of validity.
Assessing validity poses different problems for different scientific
disciplines and different variables. In the biophysical sciences, the criterion validity of one measurement technique is determined by statistically correlating its results with those of a "criterion method" or "standard method" for measuring the desired variable.67 In analytical
chemistry, for example, the inaccuracy or systematic error of a new
analytical method is determined by comparing its results with those of
another method whose accuracy has already been accepted. 8 Criterion
validation thus requires independent evidence of the validity of the cri65. See Currie, supra note 62, at 98-100 (examples of nitrogen dioxide in ambient air or
concentrations of cholesterol in blood).
66. Interstate Pollution Abatement, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,152, 48,153 (EPA 1984) (final dctcrmination) (petitioners had not corrected sulfate data for artifact formation caused by sampling technique); Interstate Pollution Abatement, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,851, 34,863 (EPA 1984) (proposed determination) (certain glass filters used by petitioning states in their high-volume air samplers were
believed to result in overestimation of true sulfate concentrations).
67. Compare Peters & Westgard, supra note 61, at 412 (accuracy of analytical method usually established by comparing results with "another method whose accuracy has already been
established") with E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER, supra note 34, at 19 (no criterion variables for
"many ifnot most measures in the social sciences"). Regulatory agencies sometimes establish
officially adopted "reference methods" as criteria. See, e.g., OSHA Regulations on Asbestos,
Tremolite, Anthophyllite, and Actinolite, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (1990); EPA Regulations on
Ambient Air Quality Surveillance, 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-50.2 (1990); EPA Regulations on National
Air Monitoring Stations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 58.30-58.36 (1990).
The statistical correlation is sometimes referred to as a "validity coefficient." E CAW,1uNES &
R. ZELLER, supra note 34, at 18; B. GHISELU. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 269;
Validity, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICAL SCIENCES 460 (S.Kotz & N. Johnson eds. 1988).
The assessment of method accuracy is also called "method validation." See, e.g., Braman. Gas
ChromatographicAnalysis in Air Pollution, in CHROMATOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS, supra note 55, at
121, 123.
68. Peters & Westgard, supra note 61, at 412. "The term Inaccuracy has been recommended
to emphasize lack of agreement [between results of the method being evaluated and the criterion
method] and is defined as the 'numerical difference between the mean of a set of replicate measurements and the true value.'" Id. (quoting Provisional Recommendation, supra note 63. at
538).
A more generic meaning of "accuracy" is the degree to which measurement results differ
from the true value. Accuracy, in that generic sense, means "total error," both random and systematic. Id. at 413.
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terion method. 9 When criterion validation is possible and its validity is
well grounded, then its empirical basis makes it a particularly strong
70
test of validity.
By contrast, an evaluation of a measurement method's construct
validity begins at the level of theory.7 1 A scientist first identifies the
logical relationships between the variable to be measured and other
variables within the theory. Then the various measurement methods for
each of the theoretically related variables are examined to determine
what statistical associations should be observed between data from the
different methods. For example, within a theory about causes of anxiety, the variable "common anxiety" might be predicted to be strongly
but negatively associated with the variable "self-esteem." That is, when
an individual's score is low with respect to "self-esteem," he or she is
expected to have a high score with respect to "common anxiety. '7 2 If
the relevant measurement methods all generate results that are statisti-

cally associated in the patterns that would be predicted by the theory,
then there is evidence that the new measurement method is valid, in
the sense that its results comport with what one expects given the theoretical relationships between variables.73
An assessment of construct validity, then, depends on the ade69. See E.

CARMINES

& R.

ZELLER,

supra note 34, at 19.

70. The level of validity that scientists consider acceptable varies from situation to situation,
See generally Currie,supra note 62, at 199-209. In the sciences, as in legal settings, the costs and
benefits are generally weighed before validity uncertainty is considered acceptable. See ld.; Peters
& Westgard, supra note 61, at 413-15 (approximate specifications for allowable analytical errors
depend upon medical mission, population being served, particular application of test, and physician's interpretation of test results); Westgard & Klec, Quality Assurance, in TEXTBOOK OF
CLINICAL CHEMISTRY, supra note 61, at 424 (quality goals for laboratories must vary, depending
upon such factors as medical missions of health care facilities and cost).
71. A third approach to validity, content validity, is sometimes used in the behavioral sciences,
when researchers evaluate a measurement tool by assessing how well the tool covers some relevant
content. E. GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 274. Examinations in an
educational setting provide obvious examples. See E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER, supra note 34, at
20 ("This type of validity has played a major role in the development and assessment of various
types of tests used in psychology and especially education but has not been employed widely by
political scientists or sociologists."). An assessment of content validity would identify the content
to be covered by the test (such as facility with different arithmetic concepts and skills), judge the
extent to which each item of the test addresses some aspect of that content, and determine
whether every aspect of that content is addressed by some item in the test. See id. at 20-22; E.
GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 275-77.
72. For discussion of this example, see E. GHISELLI, J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37,
at 282-87.
73. See generally E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER. supra note 34, at 23-26 (discussing the ideal of
having particular measures generate patterns of consistent findings when different theoretical
structures are used in a number of studies).
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quacy of the theory on which it is based, as well as on the validity of
the relevant measurement methods. Ultimately, however, construct validity is probably all we are capable of achieving. Even when criterion
validity is available, our confidence in the validity of the criterion
methods themselves must be grounded ultimately in construct validity.
Construct validity functions as a "coherence theory" of validity, in the
sense that the theory, the measurement expectations based on the theory, and the measurements themselves are all expected to cohere.
Sometimes measurement uncertainty can be reduced by carefully
evaluating the validity of the measurement techniques. Whether it is
possible to increase the validity of a method depends, of course, on the
nature of the particular method and the type of validity problems encountered. The residual measurement uncertainty traceable to
problems with validity can itself sometimes be measured. However,
our confidence in the validity of a measurement method ultimately depends upon our confidence in the theory that supports the method and
in the theory that supports any criterion method used in the validation.
There is good reason to expect more measurement uncertainty when
dealing with measurement methods that depend upon a novel or narrowly established theory for their validation .7
Decisionmakers should not merely assume that measurements offered by scientists are valid, even if those results have an aura of mathematical precision. Even variables with measurement values carried out
to many decimal places can lack validity. Validity is always a question
external to the measurement method itself; it is a question about the
proper interpretationof the data generated by the method, and involves
a scientific judgment that the data in fact give information about the
variable of interest.
74. For example, scientists can sometimes provide a validity coefficient relative to some criterion method. See supra note 67. An additional complication is sampling uncertainty, which will be
discussed in Section IV. The potential for sampling error is present because any statistical tests for
criterion validity are based on samples. The sampling uncertainty that is associated with a validity
coefficient can be dealt with using techniques discussed in Section IV.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52; cf. Giannelli, supra note 50, at 1248 (proposing
that prosecutors in a criminal case who wish to introduce a novel scientific technique should be
required to establish its validity beyond a reasonable doubt, while criminal defendants and civil
litigants should be held to a preponderance of the evidence standard in establishing the validity of
novel techniques that they wish to introduce).
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B. Reliability
In contrast to validity error, which is systematic in nature and can
be viewed as a problem external to the measurement method, unreliability is a source of error intrinsic to even validly interpreted measurement methods. A method is reliable to the extent that it is capable of
generating consistent results when repeatedly applied to the same subjects. 8 In theory, if a perfectly reliable measurement technique were
used to measure the same subject under the same circumstances, without the subject's having changed in any relevant respect, then the results of all the measurements would be identical. In practice, of course,
measurement methods are never perfectly reliable. Variations in results
arise due to changes in the surrounding circumstances or in the measurement instruments, or because of variations in the performance of
the persons conducting the measurements.
If a valid measurement method is used, such that there are no
systematic errors in the results, deviations of results from the true value
of the variable are expected to be random and to "cancel each other
out" in the long run. Under classical test theory, if a large number of
repeat measurements are made of the same thing, then the mean of
those measurements is expected to equal the "true value."' 77 While errors due to unreliability fall randomly around their mean, the mean of
all the actual measurements is expected to equal the true value in the
long run. Put differently, there should be no correlation between errors
due to unreliability and the true value.78
When reliability is increased, the extent of the random scatter
around the mean for repeat measurements is decreased.79 The difficulty
lies in determining whether reliability is in fact being increased and, if
76. See, e.g., E. GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK. supra note 37, at 184, 191 (reliability of
measurement is "the degree of self-consistency among the scores earned by an individual;" relia.
bility of measurement is "the extent of unsystematic variation in the quantitative description of
some characteristic of an individual when the same individual is measured a number of times").
The variability between repeated measurements is sometimes divided into repeatability variance
(variance recorded under identical conditions) and reproducibilityvariance (variance reflecting all
random contributions to measurement, such as different conditions, instruments, operators, sampies, days, laboratories, or environments). Hunter, Measurement Error, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
STATISTICAL SCIENCES 378, 379 (S. Kotz & N. Johnson eds. 1985); Mandel, Accuracy and Prediction: Evaluation and Interpretationof Analytical Results, in I TREATISE ON ANALYTICAL
CHEMISTRY, supra note 62, at 259.
77. See E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER. supra note 34, at 29-30.
78. See, e.g., id. at 30; J. COHEN & P. COHEN. APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 68 (2d ed. 1983).
79. See E. GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 193-94.
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so, by how much. In some situations, and particularly in the physical
sciences, it is possible to determine the degree of reliability of a method
by using a test-retest approach.8 0 In analytical chemistry, for example,
it is possible to analyze the same sample of material more than once. 81
Reliability error can be reduced (or "precision" increased) by various
techniques, depending upon the relevant measurement method.
The social sciences, however, often encounter methodological difficulties with the notion of measuring the "same" person twice, without
intervening changes in the subject due to, among other things, the
memory of having taken the same test earlier.82 One approach to this
problem is to use a multi-item questionnaire or measurement instrument. If the items of such an instrument are "parallel"-that is, they
are interchangeable and have no systematic differences in their results-then the different questionnaire items are sometimes treated as
though they are replicate measurements of the same variable.Ra In such
a case. the correlation between scores on parallel items is sometimes
used as a reliability coefficient of internalconsistency." The advantage
80. See E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER. supra note 34, at 37-40 (discussing difficulties with using
the retest method in the social sciences).
81. This is sometimes called a replication experiment, and the term precision is sometimes
used to refer to the "agreement between replicate measurements." Peters & Westgard, supra note
61, at 412 (citing ProvisionalRecommendation, supra note 63, at 538). The term Imprecision is
defined as the "standard deviation or coefficient of variation of the results of a set of replicate
measurement[s]." Id. So defined, the precision of a measurement method is a measure of its reliability, and imprecision is another term for random analytical error. See id.
Precision can be measured within the same analytical run ("within-run precision"), within
different runs on the same day ("within-day precision"), and within different runs on different
days ("day-to-day" or "between-day precision"), with the longer scales including random errors
from additional variables, such as different operators or other conditions in the laboratory. Id. The
reliability or precision of a method can also be assessed between laboratories, using split samples
of the same test material. See. e.g., Mandel, supra note 76, at 256-60.
82. See, e.g., E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER. supra note 34, at 39.40. 50. A logically similar
technique is to divide the total number of items (questions) in a survey or test instrument into
halves (the "split-halves" method) and examine the degree of correlation between the two halves.
Difficulties arise, however, in determining how to partition the different items into two groups:
different groupings are likely to result in different reliability estimates. Id. at 41-43, 50.
83. See id. at 32-34, 47 (differences between truly parallel measurements due to purely random error); E. GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 192 ("reliability can be
defined as the extent of unsystematic variation of one individual's scores on a series of parallel
tests").
84. F. GHISELL. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 204. 257-58.
One of the most popular of such measures is Cronbach'scoefficient alpha. which is a function
of the average correlation between all of the multiple items in the instrument (the mean inter-item
correlation). E. CARNSINES & R. ZELLER, supra note 34, at 43-47. Cronbach's alpha is a conservative estimate of an instrument's internal consistency: if the items are truly parallel, with inter-item
correlations all being equal, see E. GISELu. J. CAMPBELL & S ZEDICK. supra note 37. at 203-04,
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of such a notion is that consistency can be determined on the basis of a
5
single administration of an instrument.

When measures of reliability are available, they can be used to
characterize the residual uncertainty associated with reliability. In the
case of standardized measures varying between zero and one, zero usually indicates totally random results (no correlation between scores in a
replication experiment or on parallel tests, or no inter-item correlation)
and one indicates perfect correlation with no inconsistency in results.80
The acceptability of any given degree of reliability should be a function
of the purpose for which the results are to be used. 1 Depending upon
the risks, benefits, and policies involved in a given legal setting, one
level of reliability might be acceptable in one proceeding, such as an
administrative rulemaking, but unacceptable in another, such as a
criminal trial. 88
IV.

SAMPLING UNCERTAINTY

Scientists seldom classify or measure all of the things or instances
they ideally would like to measure. Such incomplete observation often
occurs for practical reasons: the incremental information to be gained
by observing every instance often diminishes drastically in significance
as additional measurements are made. There can also be theoretical
then Cronbach's alpha is equal to the reliability coefficient, see E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER. supra
note 34, at 45; E. GHISELLI, J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 203-04. To the extent
that the average inter-item correlation decreases toward zero, Cronbach's alpha likewise decreases
toward zero. See E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER, supra note 34, at 45.
The internal inconsistency of a multi-item measurement, as measured by Cronbach's alpha,
can be reduced in several ways. First, as items or questions are better constructed so that the
average inter-item correlation is increased, the Cronbach's alpha for the instrument will increase.
See id. at 45-46. In addition, for any given average of inter-item correlation, the Cronbach's alpha
will increase as the number of items in the measurement instrument increases. Id.
85. E. GHISELLI, J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 253.
86. Id. at 193-94, 204, 205-07 (discussing reliability coefficient); E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER.
supra note 34, at 45 (discussing Cronbach's alpha).
87. For example, lawyers are familiar with the specious precision of numbers specified to decimal places well beyond what is truly significant. Carrying a number to decimal places well beyond
what can be justified given the level of precision of the measurement method appears to serve no
function except to mislead. See, e.g., Berry & Geisser, Inference in Cases of Disputed Paternity,

in STATISTICS

AND THE LAW

353, 376 (M. DeGroot, S. Fienberg & J.Kadane ed. 1986) (example

of using six-digit paternity index when measurement and sampling uncertainty render calculations
to more than two digits "suspect").
88. While analytical chemists might expect a high degree of precision before they would consider a measurement method sufficiently reliable, social scientists generally expect a Cronbach's
alpha of only 0.8 before they regard a multi-item instrument as sufficiently reliable. E. CARMINES
& R. ZELLER. supra note 34, at 51 ("reliabilities should not be below .80 for widely used scales").
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barriers to observing every instance.8 9 Much of the power of science,
and much of its attractiveness to decisionmakers, lies in its historical
ability to generalize beyond the scope of personal observation, whether
such generalizations are important for broad policy decisions (such as
environmental or economic regulation) or as part of the rationale for
deciding a particular case (for example, a generic causal connection
between a kind of pharmaceutical and the plaintiff's type of injury in a
tort case). When scientists generalize, however, they create the potential for sampling error.90
Statisticians refer to the set of actual measurements as the sample, and to the larger set of potential measurements as the population.91 A summary number characterizing a sample is called a statistic
(for example, the proportion of sample instances in a certain category
or the arithmetic mean of sample measurements), while the corresponding characteristic of a population is called a parameter.2 Sampling error is the error that can be introduced into our conclusions by
the process of inferring a parameter from a statistic. The potential for
such error can be thought of as sampling uncertainty.
Scientists have made substantial progress in their ability to determine or characterize sampling uncertainty. Within the classical theories of probability and statistics, 3 the two major (but related) approaches are "significance testing" and the construction of "confidence
intervals."9 4 These techniques, which will be discussed in turn, can be
89. See. e.g., H. LOETHER & D. McTAvIsH, supra note 37. at 5-6. Theoretical barriers occur
when some instances will occur in the future (instances that arc not yet observable), or when a set
is infinite (e.g., the set of spatial points in a force field).
90. If the scientific information relevant to decisionmaking relates merely to the measurement
of a particular thing, then conceptual and measurement uncertainties might be the only uncertainties associated with the information. More frequently, however, individual measurements are
made in the process of ultimately drawing a conclusion about a group of things, not all of which
have been measured or observed individually.
91. H. LOETHER & D. McTAVISH, supra note 37, at 4-5, see W. HAYS. STA^rsTlcs 190-92
(4th ed. 1988).
92. H. LOETHER & D. McTAVtSH, supra note 37, at 6.
93. The classical theories interpret probability statements as assertions about long-run relative
frequencies or proportions. Another interpretation of probability statements will be discussed in
Section VII, in connection with epistemic uncertainty. That alternative interpretation also provides an alternative approach to determining sampling uncertainty.
94. These two techniques provide adequate illustrations of sampling uncertainty, although
they are both examples of ways to deal with "Type I error"-the type of error made when a
correct hypothesis about a population parameter is rejected. This Article does not discuss the type
of sampling error called "Type II error"-the error made when an incorrect hypothesis about the
parameter is not rejected-or the "power" of a study to reject an incorrect hypothesis. See. e.g..
W. HAYS, supra note 91, at 261-63; H. LoarnER & D. McTAViSL. supra note 37. at 511-15. Cf.
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of great use to decisionmakers, provided the techniques are properly
understood and their limitations respected.
A. Significance Testing
All classical reasoning about sampling uncertainty is hypothetical
in form: if the unknown parameter is x, what can we deduce about the
probability of drawing certain samples from that population? The reasoning known as significance testing or hypothesis testing begins by
positing an hypothesis about the value of the population parameter,
then using that hypothetical value to reach conclusions about the
probability of obtaining values for statistics in samples. Drawing a
sample with a statistic whose probability is extremely low thus provides
evidence against the truth of the hypothesis. We therefore may conclude that such an hypothesis is unlikely to state the true parameter
value.
An example should help to clarify this reasoning. Suppose that
there are 100 balls in a closed box (the population). Suppose also that
each of the balls is either red or white, and that we are trying to reach
a conclusion about the proportion of red balls in the box. We are allowed to draw out ten balls without replacing any, line them up, and
examine them (the sample). If we draw 4 red balls and 6 white, we can
reach a limited number of conclusions about the population with no
sampling uncertainty. For example, any conclusion that the population
contains less than 4 red balls or more than 94 red balls would be demonstrably false. 5 We cannot be certain, however, of the total number
of red balls, other than knowing it is between 4 and 94.
Under certain conditions we can go further in structuring our uncertainty. For example, if we draw our sample as a simple random
sample (that is, every possible sample of 10 balls has an equal chance
of being the sample that we draw), 96 then, even if we draw our sample
Confidence in Probability,supra note 13, at 410-17 (explaining Type I and Type II errors); Feinberg, Teaching the Type I and Type H Errors: The Judicial Process, THE Am. STATISTICIAN,
June 1971, at 30 (using the null hypothesis that a specific criminal defendant is innocent); Statistical Decision Theory, supra note 5, at 364 (discussing standing for complaining of Type II error).
95. If we had drawn the sample while replacing the ball in the box after each draw, we could
be certain only that at least one ball in the population is red and that at least one ball is white.
96. See, e.g., W. HAYS, supra note 91, at 52-53; H. LoETHER & D. McTAvISH. supra note 37,
at 407. What allows us to structure our uncertainty within the range of possible values in the
example in the text is the assumption about the equal probability of drawing any particular sample. It is not essential, however, that the sample be a simple random sample. What is essential is
that the sampling be conducted in such a way that we are able to generate a probability distribution for the relevant statistic in all possible samples of a given size, and we are therefore able to
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while replacing each ball after it has been drawn and examined, we
can conclude that it is extremely unlikely that there are only 4 red
balls in the box. The reasoning is as follows. First, consider the hypothesis that only 4 balls out of the 100 are red. If each ball has an equal
chance of being drawn, then on each draw the probability of drawing a
red ball is 4/100, or 0.04.9 7 We can conceptualize our sample as a
sequence of 10 events, each event being a drawing with a 0.04 chance
of drawing a red ball. 8 In addition, we can calculate the probability of
drawing 4 red balls in our sample of 10. 1In this case, the probability
is very, very small. 100 Because the likelihood of drawing a simple random sample containing 4 red balls is so small, we conclude that our
hypothesis about there being only 4 red balls in the population is probattach a probability to drawing any particular sample (e.g., a sample having 4 red balls out of 10).
See, e.g., id. at 415-22 (discussing cluster and stratified random samples); W HAYS, supra note
91, at 53, 209-10. Such a probability distribution is called a sampling distributionfor the statistic.
H. LOETHER & D. McTAvISH. supra note 37, at 435.
97. See. e.g., W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 120 ("For equally probable elementary events the
probability of any event A is simply the ratio of the number of members of A to the total number
of elementary events."). In terms that will be used later, this formulation involves a "relative
frequency" interpretation of probability statements. See id. at 25-28.
98. Each such event is usually referred to as a "Bernoulli trial," if there are only two outcomes (drawing a red ball or drawing a white ball). Moreover, because we are sampling independently with replacement, so that the probability of drawing a red ball remains unchanged from
draw to draw, the sampling constitutes a "stationary" Bernoulli process. See W. HAYS. supra note
91, at 128-31.
99. The probability of any given sequence of N independent Bernoulli trials is given by
pr x qN-r,

where r is the number of "successes" (here, drawing a red ball). N-r is the number ofr"failures"
(drawing a white ball), p is the probability of a success on each trial, and q is the probability or a
failure (q = I - p). W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 128-29.
In addition, the number of distinct sequences by which r successes can occur within N trials
is given by th6 binomial coefficient, written as

and defined as
rl(N-r)l
Id. at 125-26, 129-30. Thus, the probability of observing exactly r successes in N independent
trials, regardless of the order in which the successes occur, is:
pr(r.N~p) - (Npq_?
where p is the probability of a success in any given trial. Id. at 130.
100. The probability of drawing exactly 4 red balls and 6 white balls when p - 0.04 is
(approximately):
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ably false, and we can reject it with a substantial amount of
confidence. 10 1

As it turns out, the hypothesis yielding the greatest number of 10ball simple random samples containing exactly 4 red balls is the hy-

pothesis that the box contains 40 red balls.10 2 In other words, the hypothesis that makes a sample of 40 % red balls most likely is the hypothesis that 40% of the balls in the population 'are red.103 A
population with only 39 red balls (or one with 41 red balls) would also
yield a 4-red-ball sample with a rather high probability, so the hypothesis of 40 % is not significantly stronger than an hypothesis of 39 % (or
41 %).104 An hypothesis of 40 red balls is substantially stronger, how-

(10)

(0.04)4 (0.96)6 = (210)(0.0000026)(0.7827578)

= (210X0.000002)
= 0.00042.
101. On similar reasoning, the hypothesis that 94 out of the 100 balls are red would also be
rejected. So would hypotheses that the box contains exactly 5 or 93 red balls, and so forth.
102. If 40 of the 100 balls are red, then the probability p for any Bernoulli trial is 0.4, q is
0.6, and the probability of drawing exactly 4 red balls out of 10 is (approximately):

('0) (0.4)' (0.6)6 = (210)(0.0256)(0.046656)
= (210)(0.0011944)

= 0.2508.
Thus, if there are 40 red balls in all, the probability of drawing a sample with 4 red balls is
slightly greater than /4.
103. See W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 195-97 (if no prior information at all about the value of
the population proportion p, then the maximum likelihood estimate of p would be the sample
proportion P, since among all possible values of p this value makes the actual sample P have the
greatest a priori likelihood).
104. The probability of drawing a 4-red-ball sample out of a population containing 39 red
balls is (approximately):

( 0) (0.39)' (0.61)' = (210)(0.0231344) (0.0515204)
= (210)(0.0011919)
= 0.2503.

The probability from a 41-red-ball population is (approximately):
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ever, than an hypothesis of, say, 20.105

Scientists have adopted the convention that hypotheses are generally rejected, for scientific purposes, if the sample actually drawn is in
that subset of least likely samples that collectively has a probability less
than 0.05 (less than 1 chance in 20).1o° Therefore, a sample result is
routinely said to be "statistically significant" with respect to an hypothesis if the probability of drawing a statistic at least as extreme as
that actually drawn is less than 0.05; such sampling results are conventionally regarded as a proper basis for rejecting the hypothesis. 1°7 If the
sampling results are not statistically significant, the hypothesis should
not be rejected, and no conclusion is justified about the truth of the
hypothesis on the basis of this sample (given the 0.05 convention).
There are several techniques for reducing sampling uncertainty.
The obvious method, increasing the size of the sample, does so in two

(10)

(0.A 1) (0.59)6 = (210)(0.0282576)(0.0421805)
= (210)(0.0011919)
= 0.2503.

The probability distribution for drawing 4 red balls out of 10 has its highest single value for a
population that has 40% of its balls colored red.
105. Whereas drawing a simple random sample of 4 red balls has a probability of 0.2508
given a box with 40 red balls, see supra note 102, drawing such a sample has a probability of only
0.088 given a box with with 20 red balls:

(40)

(0.2)" (0.8)6 = (210)(0.0016)(0.262144)
= (210)(0.0004194)

=0.088.
106. E.g., M. BLAND. AN INRODUCTION TO MEDICAL STATISTICS 152 (1987) (medical sciences); J. COHEN & P. COHEN, supra note 78, at 20-21 (behavioral sciences); H. LOETHER & D.
McTAvisH. supra note 37, at 508-09 (sociology); Cowles & Davis, On the Origins of the .05 Level

of StatisticalSignificance, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 553, 553 (May 1982); Vare, Mostcllcr & Ingelfinger, P Values, in MEDICAL USES OF STATISTICS, 149, 155-158 (J. Bailar Ill & F. Mostcller
eds. 1986) (medical literature).

There appears to be no compelling reason for making the so-called "critical value" 0.05, or
the "critical region" for rejecting hypotheses the range of probabilities less than 0.05 (prob. <
0.05). For a discussion of the origin of the 0.05 convention and criticisms of its mechanical application, see references cited infra note 127.

107. See generally M. BLAND, supra note 106, at 148-62; W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 249-63;
H. LoTHER & D. McTAvISH. supra note 37, at 499-526.
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ways. First, increasing the size of a sample drawn without replacement
can decrease the range over which our uncertainty extends, at least
when the population size is finite.108 Observing even one more ball (for
example, another red one) would tell us more about the composition of
the population (namely, that at least 5 balls are red). Second,
probability distributions for statistics such as proportions or arithmetic
means are a function of sample size, with the result that the number of
rejectable hypotheses increases with the increase in sample size.109
Other techniques for reducing sampling uncertainty relate to sampling design. For instance, sampling a small population without replacement can increase the precision of the sample estimate compared
to sampling with replacement.110 And in some situations, a stratified
random sample can have a smaller sampling error than a simple random sample of the same size. " Thus, variations in sampling design
can directly affect the amount of residual sampling uncertainty.
A primary function of significance testing is to provide a means of
characterizing one type of residual sampling uncertainty.11 2 The
probability of drawing a certain sample, given an hypothesis about the
population, is an indirect measure of the uncertainty that can be introduced by the sampling process. 113 If we can calculate the probability
that the statistic in our sample would be drawn from a population ac108. Cf. M. FINKELSTEIN & B. LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 261 (1990) (for small populations, sampling without replacement produces somewhat more precise estimates than sampling
with replacement, "because as the sample size increases to an appreciable fraction of the popula-

tion, it becomes increasingly unlikely that the sample mean will vary by a given amount from the
population mean"); W.

HAYS.

supra note 91, at 205-06 (variance of sampling distribution of the

mean "tends to be somewhat smaller" for a fixed sample size N from a finite population than
from an infinite population).
109. See, e.g., W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 237-38.
110. See supra note 108.

111. H. LOETHER & D. McTAVISH, supra note 37, at 418. In a stratified random sample, "the
population is divided into subpopulations (strata) and then simple random samples are drawn
from each subpopulation." Id. at 418. This sampling method can reduce sampling error, when

compared to a simple random sample of the same size, if the strata or subpopulations are determined using variables correlated with the variables of the study, thus producing more homogeneity

in the subpopulations than exists in the population. Id. at 418-19.
112. See supra note 94.

113. This measure is "indirect" in the sense that it is not a direct measure of our uncertainty
about the true value of the parameter, but rather a measure of the likelihood of drawing a particular sample (statistic) given a particular hypothesis about the population. E.g., W. HAYS, supra

note 91, at 236 (the probability statement is not really about the population parameter, but about
samples); cf. Ware, Mosteller & Ingelfinger, supra note 106, at 154 ("popular misconception is
that the P value is the probability that the null hypothesis is true"). A subjective interpretation of
the meaning of probability statements, however, might allow us to conceptualize this as a direct
measure of our uncertainty about the parameter. See infra text accompanying note 213.

1991]

THE SIREN SONGS OF SCIENCE

curately characterized by some particular hypothesis, then that
probability is a measure of our risk of being wrong if we were to reject
that hypothesis as our estimate of the population parameter. If we reject hypotheses only when our sampling results have a probability of
less that 0.05, our rate of rejecting true hypotheses should be less than
1 case in 20. Once scientists had develcped quantitative methods for
assessing such a risk, this achievement was followed by the informal
adoption of conventional quantitative thresholds for rejecting hypotheses, for deciding when such sampling uncertainty is "sufficiently low"
for scientific purposes."1 4
This reasoning has been relied upon in various ways by decisionmakers in legal settings. Courts trying claims of unlawful discrimination routinely use such calculations of probability to determine
whether a plaintiff has presented a prima facie case under either the
fourteenth amendment or Title VII." 58 In such cases, the probability of
drawing a sample with a particular racial or sexual composition (for
example, the proportion of minority or women candidates actually
hired) in a simple random manner from the population (those eligible
to be hired) is taken as an indication of whether the selection process
(the hiring process) was actually unbiased with respect to race or sex.
Courts and agencies also rely upon significance testing for the
same purpose as scientists: to estimate values of unknown parameters." 6 In such cases, decisionmakers often find the generation of confidence intervals a more useful form of information than the probabilities
deduced by significance testing.
114.

See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.

115. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 490 U.S. 642, 650-55 (1989) (statistically
significant disparate impact, together with showing that specific employment practices caused the
disparity, can make out prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977) (if
deviation of actual number of black teachers hired from expected number is more than "two or
three standard deviations," this would "undercut the hypothesis that decisions wcre being made
randomly with respect to race'); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482. 496 & n.17 (1977) (prima
facie case of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in grand jury selection established if difference between expected number of Mexican-Americans to be selected and actual number selected is "greater than two or three standard deviations"); Palmer v. Shultz. 815 F.2d 84, 90. 96
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (statistically significant deviations at 0.05 level in either direction from equality
in selection rates constitute prima facie case of unlawful discrimination). See generally Statistical
Decision Theory, supra note 5.

116. E.g., Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (EPA
1986) (quantitative risk extrapolations generally performed only on data from animal studies for
tumor sites showing "statistically significant elevations" in tumor incidence).
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B.

Confidence Intervals

The second principal method of classical statistical theory for
characterizing sampling uncertainty is the construction of confidence
intervals.117 This technique is closely related to significance testing in
its underlying rationale. In effect, the technique takes the set of all
possible hypotheses about the parameter and divides the hypotheses
into those that can and cannot be rejected on the basis of the sample
drawn. By reporting a confidence interval for red balls, for example, of
10 - 70, we are saying that, given our sample, hypotheses of less than
10 and greater than 70 should be rejected.
All the hypotheses about the true population value that fall
outside the confidence interval can be rejected on the basis of the sample. In order to construct any particular interval, of course, we need to
identify the threshold probability below which hypotheses should be rejected. This probability is usually the same conventional 0.05 discussed
above. 1 ' In other words, the sample results are statistically significant
for all hypotheses outside the confidence interval.119 The hypotheses
within the confidence interval are those that cannot be rejected on the
basis of the sample (the sample results are not statistically significant
for those hypotheses). A confidence interval, therefore, is a means of
identifying which hypotheses can be rejected, given the sample and the
threshold probability selected for rejecting hypotheses.
Confidence intervals are also explained in terms of "estimates,"
instead of hypotheses.1 20 We sometimes use sample results to make a
single point estimate of the parameter. Thus, in our example of red and
white balls, we can use the percentage of red balls in our sample
(40%) to estimate that 40% of the balls in the population are red.121
By so restricting our estimate to a single value, however, we incur a
117.

. ..

The following are illustrations of notation for confidence intervals:

... "; "CI = X -+. .. "; "CI = ...-....

. ..

x -

..

118. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
119. J. COHEN & P. COHEN, supra note 78, at 63; W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 206-09, 235-39
(if hypothetical value for parameter not covered by confidence interval, then hypothesis may be

rejected).
120. See generally M. BLAND, supra note 106, at 134-45; M.

FINKELSTEIN

& B. LEVIN, supra

note 108, at 171-81, 227; W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 206-09, 235-39.
121. It can be demonstrated theoretically that the proportion in a sample is an unbiased, maximum-likelihood estimator of the proportion in the population, provided the sample (of size N) is
drawn as a result of N independent trials and the probability of a specified outcome (here, "drawing a red ball") remains the same throughout the trials. That is, in the long run, the mean of the
proportions in all possible such samples of the same size is identical to the population proportion.
W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 128-39, 195-99, 240-41.
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sizeable risk of being wrong. If, however, we use our sample statistic to
generate an interval estimate (a range of values) for the parameter,
then we can increase the likelihood that our estimate captures the parameter somewhere within it. In our example of sampling without replacement, we could be certain that the interval estimate of 4 - 94 red
balls would capture the true value for the population. We can narrow
our interval estimate if we are willing to accept some degree of confidence short of certainty. We can choose any specified probability for
constructing a confidence interval."22 For example, a 95% confidence
interval is broad enough to give us at least a 0.95 probability (19/20
chance) of containing the true parameter value.
Under the classical theory of probability, interpreting the meaning
of a confidence interval requires some care in terminology. With a 95 %
confidence interval, we draw the conclusion that the probability is at
least 0.95 that the sample drawn and confidence interval constructed is
one
of those samples and intervals that includes the parameter within
it.123 The method is driven, therefore, by assumptions about the sampling process, the probability distribution for statistics given that process, and the selection of a "level of confidence" for constructing the
intervals. Just as with statistical significance in hypothesis testing, it is
a matter of convention to use a 95 % confidence interval,1 24 although
higher levels of confidence are sometimes used by scientists. 12
Nothing in the reasoning behind hypothesis testing requires statistical significance to be identified with 0.05 probability or the level of
confidence to be 95% or greater. It may simply be that once sampling
uncertainty has been quantified usng probability theory, the simplest
answer to the question of what level of uncertainty should be acceptable is to pick a probability by consensus. This approach, however,*
would hardly seem defensible if it were adopted by decisionmakers in
legal contexts. 126 Deciding when sampling uncertainty is sufficiently
122. See id. at 235-37.
123.
124.

Id.; J. COHEN & P. COHEN, supra note 78, at 62.
See, e.g., J. COHEN & P. COHEN, supra note 78, at 52, 63; W HAYSs. supra note 91. at

235-37, 249-63; Cowles & Davis, supra note 106, at 553.
125. Ninety-nine percent confidence intervals are not uncommon. See. e.g., ware., Mosteller
& Ingelfinger, supra note 106, at 155-57. Often a lower probability than 0.05 is reported ifit is
significantly lower. The usual benchmarks for reporting lower probabilities are decreasing orders

of magnitude: :S 0.01, --0.001, etc. See J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78. at 20-21 (behavioral sciences).

126. See J. COHRSSEN & V. COVELLO, supra note 27, at 92 (use of confidence intervals is a
relatively common method used by analysts of environmental risks to limit problems with extreme
upper- and lower-bound risk estimates, but there is an implicit policy judgment in selecting 95%
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low for legal purposes should not be a matter of mere quantitative convention. 127 In the case of socially significant decisions, the decision
whether to proceed on the basis of data that creates a given level of
sampling uncertainty should take into account such factors as the costs
and benefits of so proceeding. Such factors vary from case to case and
are not taken into account at all by the scientific convention. When real
errors, and real costs and benefits, hang in the balance, it might well be
unreasonable for a decisionmaker to choose not to rely on study results
merely because they have not quite crossed the currently conventional

bright line into "statistical significance."
Decisionmakers would be better served by scientific information
that includes a range of confidence intervals, covering the range of
levels of confidence in which the decisionmaker might be interested.
Such a range would show the decisionmaker the sensitivity of the confidence intervals to the choice of a level of confidence. Reporting only a
95 % confidence interval might not tell the decisionmaker all she or he
needs to know about the residual sampling uncertainty.
V.

MODELING UNCERTAINTY

In addition to recording observed values for variables and generalizing from those limited observations to populations, scientists use
mathematics to relate multiple variables: values for one variable are
expressed as a mathematical function of values for other variables. 128
as a measure of confidence).
127. See Confidence in Probability,supra note 13, at 409-417 (appropriate level of significance requires consideration of both possibility of errors and the costs associated with error; conventional but arbitrary test of statistical significance for scientific hypotheses has been applied in
legal system without critical analysis); StatisticalDecision Theory, supra note 5, at 364 (appropriate level of significance in discrimination cases is a "legal issue" that depends upon what is at
risk in making a Type I error).
For scientific discussions consistent with this view, see generally W. HAYS. supra note 91, at
246-61, 281-82 ("conventions about significant results should not be turned into canons of good
scientific practice"); McCloskey, The Loss Function Has Been Mislaid: The Rhetoric of Significance Tests, 75 AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 201 (1985) ("Roughly three-quarters of the contributors to the American Economic Review misuse the test of significance."); Silber & Kaizer,
Loss Weighting and the Human Cost of Experimentation, 38 J. CHRONIC DISABILITY 507 (1985)
(arguing that choice of level of statistical significance in medical clinical studies is a function of
implicit decision concerning relative importance of future vs. present patients); Ware, Mosteller &
Ingelfinger, supra note 106, at 155-56 (the popular scientific convention has disadvantage of suggesting "a rather mindless cutoff point, which has nothing to do with the importance of the dccision to be made or with the costs and losses associated with the outcomes"). But cf. Cowles &
Davis, supra note 106, at 553 (detailing history behind adoption of the convention, and suggesting
that the choice was related to the earlier concept of "probable error").
128. See, e.g., W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 341-48 (providing example of linear function be-
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Such mathematical functions provide the basis for prediction or for
testing an explanatory theory. For example, if groups living in proximity to electric power transmission lines were to experience a higher than
normal incidence of childhood leukemia, then the mathematical relationship between exposure to electromagnetic fields and developing leukemia might be evidence of causation and might provide guidance for
regulatory decisions about permissible duration of exposure and field
strength.12 9
Whenever we express one variable as a mathematical function of
another variable, we create the potential for a kind of error not yet
discussed in this Article. Modeling uncertainty arises whenever a claim
is made that variable Y has a particular mathematical relationship to
variable X. In general, modeling errors are made either through choosing the wrong mathematical function or by incorrectly specifying its
constants. For example, if someone were to claim that for every milligauss of alternating magnetic field to which one is exposed for some
specified period of time the risk of leukemia increases by "two times,"
he might be in error because simple multiplication is not the correct
form of the relationship (perhaps risk increases exponentially, instead
of as a simple product). On the other hand, the number "two" in "two
times" might be incorrect; the correct number might be "three," or
perhaps "one-half." Modeling uncertainty-the potential for such modeling errors-is thus created whenever two or more variables are related to each other mathematically.
Modeling error results in descriptive error about the world, generally in the form of predictive error: the predictions of the values for a
variable turn out to be false.130 Predictive error, however, is not identitween two variables). Often, mathematical functions relate statistics for one variable (such as a
percentage or the mean) to statistics for other variables, instead of relating individual values to
individual values. When I refer to "values of a variable" in this context, I am referring to either
particular values or statistics based on those values.
129. See. e.g., Scientific Advisory Panel, New York State Power Lines Project, Final Report
on Biological Effects of Power Line Fields 72-87 (July 1. 1987) (part of research program conducted under agreement between New York State Public Service Commission and New York
Power Authority, and administered by New York State Department or Health).
130. Although mathematical modeling is an important step toward the establishment of causal
theories, which are discussed in Section VI infra, prediction is still a major objective behind mathematical modeling. The traditional use of regression analysis in the behavioral sciences has been
for prediction, with only incidental attention to explanation or causal analyis. J CoHieN & P
COHEN. supra note 78, at 41, 111. Although this emphasis has been changing, prediction still
remains an important role for mathematical modeling. Id. at 111-15. An illustration or the usefulness of predictor variables, regardless of underlying causal networks, can be found in DeTray,
Veteran Status as a Screening Device, 72 AM. EcON. REV. 133 (1982) (employing multiple regres-
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cal to modeling error. Errors in predictions can result from conceptual
error, measurement error, or sampling error, as well as from modeling
error. If we select or define variables inappropriately, make errors in
measurement, or generalize improperly, we can be led to false predictions, even if our mathematical model happens to be the correct one.
On the other hand, even in situations where a completely valid and
reliable measurement method is used to classify instances correctly,
modeling error might still occur once we try to express one variable as
a mathematical function of another variable. In order to focus attention
on modeling error alone, I will assume that all predictive error in the
following analysis is due to modeling error.
This section of the Article provides an extended example of modeling uncertainty by discussing linear regression models. These models
are commonly used for predictive purposes in science. 1 31 Their use by

agencies and courts has grown tremendously, addressing problems as
diverse as investigating the economic effects of rulemaking or determining the existence of past discrimination or voting dilution.1 32 Regression
13 3
models also provide an important foundation for claims of causality.
A.

Bivariate Linear Regression
A bivariate linear regression model expresses one variable as a

"linear" mathematical function of one other variable. The variable
whose values are being predicted is the dependent variable; the variable
sion model to test hypotheses about the predictive value of veteran status for future worker productivity); see also J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 114-15 (discussing techniques useful
only for prediction of values of the dependent variable, but not for causal analysis). An illustration
of models being constructed primarily for predictive purposes is provided by W. BERRY & S.
FELDMAN. MULTIPLE REGRESSION IN PRACTICE 59 (1985) (using polynomial transforms to
achieve linearity).
131. See generally M. BLAND, supra note 106, at 188-215 (medicine); J. COHEN & P. COHEN,
supra note 78 (behavioral sciences); W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 544-733 (experimental psychology); H. LOaTHER & D. MCTAVISH, supra note 37, at 232-47, 306-40 (sociology); Godfrey, Simple Linear Regression in Medical Research, in MEDICAL USES OF STATISTICS 170 (J. Bailar Ill &
F. Mosteller ed. 1986) (focusing on examples from articles published in the New EnglandJournal
of Medicine).
132. See generally M. FINKELSTEIN & B. LEVIN, supra note 108, at 323-467; Regression
Studies, supra note 5; Fisher, supra note 7; Finkelstein, supra note 7. E.g., Bazemore v. Friday,
478 U.S. 385 (1986) (employment discrimination); Campos v. City of Baytown, Texas, 840 F.2d
1240 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1002 (1989) (voting dilution). For an illustration of
using multiple regression to determine the incremental effect of regulation, see Spiller, supra note
7 (airline regulation). For a critique of a multiple regression model on a regulatory matter, see
Graham & Garber, Evaluatingthe Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 3 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 206 (1984).
133. See infra text accompanying notes 163-85.
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used in making the prediction is the independent variable.1' On a
graph, the values of the independent variable X are conventionally laid
out along the horizontal axis, increasing from 0 (at the intersection
with the vertical or Y axis) toward the right. See Figure 1. The values
of Y are scaled along the vertical axis. Each instance can then be located as a point on the graph by identifying its value for each of the
two variables (for example, X = 25, Y = 20).

(25,201

B = slope

=

AY
A

0,0
Figure 1

A model is linear if the form of the mathematical function defines
a straight line.1 35 The straight line sloping up and to the right in Figure
134. Medical literature uses the terminology outcome variable or response variable (referring
to the dependent variable) and predictorvariable (referring to the independent variable). See M,
BLAND, supra note 106, at 190; Godfrey, supra note 131, at 170-71.

135. The algebraic form of the model is:

tj -A+

B(X ,

where V'i is the predicted value of the dependent variable Y for instance i and X, is the value of

the variable X for that same instance i. A is called the Y-Intercept or regressionconstant: B is
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1 is the geometric interpretation of a positive linear function. For every
value of X (for example, 25) the line relates some single value of Y
(here, 20). This model is "linear" because it assigns a constant amount
of change to the value of the dependent variable (Y) for each unit
change in the value of the independent variable (X) over the relevant
range of values of the independent variable. 13 6 This can be seen from
Figure 1, which depicts that when X = 0, Y = A (hence, A is called
the "Y-intercept," the point at which the line crosses the Y axis), and
that as the value of X increases, the value of Y increases at a constant
rate B.137
If a bivariate linear regression model is used for prediction, then
the value of Y that is predicted for any value of X is provided by the
line defined by the model.' 38 In general, then, predictive error occurs
when the true value of Y deviates from the predicted value. Geometrically, a plot of paired actual values for X and Y can be constructed, as
in Figure 2; predictive error occurs whenever the plotted points do not
fall precisely on the straight line that is used in making the
3
predictions.1
called the regression coefficient or slope for predicting Y from X. See generally J. COHEN & P.
COHEN. supra note 78, at 11-12, 41-44; H. LOETHER & D. McTAViSH. supra note 37, at 242-47;
L. SCHROEDER, D. SJoQuIsT & P. STEPHAN, UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 11-17 (1986); Godfrey, supra note 131, at 171-81.
Although regression models are most often applied in practice to sample data, the models as
such are applicable to population data as well. Thus, when sample-based estimates are made of
parameters of the regression model for the population, significance testing and the construction of
confidence intervals can be used to characterize sampling uncertainty. See, e.g., J. COHEN & P.
COHEN, supra note 78, at 62-65; W. HAYS, supra note 91, at 571-73, 588-93. The discussion in
this section assumes that the models are being applied to sample data or to completely enumerated population values, in order to emphasize that modeling uncertainty is logically distinct from
the potential for sampling error.
136. J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 27; Finkelstein, supra note 7, at 1448; Godfrey,
supra note 131, at 171.
137. A straight line is defined by point [0,a] and slope/f. See, e.g., M. BLAND, supra note 106,
at 188-189; W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 545-48.
138. In practice, of course, the actual prediction of the value of Y for a given value of X will
be made by using the algebraic definition of the line, see supra note 135, not the geometric depiction as such. The predicted value of Y would lie precisely on the line defined by the model.
139. As mentioned earlier, supra text accompanying note 130, such predictive error can also
occur when measurements of Y are in error. The true value of Y might lie on the prediction line,
and no modeling error is present, but an error in measurement might hide this fact by giving an
observed value for Y that does not fall on the prediction line. Similarly, when measurements of
independent variables contain errors, the modeling results can be expected to be affected. E.g.,
Graham, supra note 132, at 212-13.
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1986: S1mmoa V.Delgado
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Figure 2
Source: Campos v. City of Baytown, Texas, 840 F.2d 1240. 1251 (5th Cir. 1988) (regressing
proportion of vote for minority candidate on proportion minority in population, by precinct;
Y-intercept (A) = 0.37, slope (B) - 0.46).

There may be an infinite number of straight lines that could be
used as predictive models for any given set of data. Selecting a particular straight line occurs when particular values are chosen for the constants A and B. If predictive error shows up as the difference between
the predicted value (a point on the line) and the observed value (a
point determined by actual data, which may or may not be on the
line), 40 the amount of modeling error that results is clearly dependent
upon which of many possible lines is chosen as the predictive model.
The most commonly used measure of average error associated
with a model is the average of the squared differences between predicted values for Y and observed values of Y. 141 Scientists reduce mod140. The observed or measured value is identical to the true value if there is no measurement
error.
141. Squaring the difference between the predicted and the observed values has distinct advantages over using either the signed differences themselves or their absolute values. Squaring the
differences, however, weights larger errors more than smaller errors. See generally M. FINKELSTEIN & B. LEVIN, supra note 108, at 332-36.
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eling uncertainty by using a technique called least squares to select the
straight line that produces the least amount of predictive error, measured by squared differences. 142 Such a "best-fitting" linear model is
called the linear regression equation of Y on X.
Identifying the linear regression model for any data set selects the
"best" of all possible linear models, but does not ensure that there is no
residual modeling uncertainty. This residual modeling uncertainty is reflected in the remaining scatter of the observed values of Y around the
best-fitting regression line. Figure 2 provides an illustration, in which
the proportion of vote for a minority candidate (by precinct) in a city
council election was regressed on the proportion of minority population.
Scientists characterize the residual modeling uncertainty in differ1 43
ent ways, depending upon the uses to which the modeling will be put.
Probably the most frequently encountered approach is to compare the
residual error using the regression model to the error that would result
if the mean of Y alone were used as a predictor. This approach tells us
how much better off we are using the regression line to predict Y, instead of simply predicting Y using the mean of all the values of Y.
Such a comparison is a means of gauging whether it is better to use the
values of X and the regression line to predict Y, or whether we should
simply ignore X and base our prediction on Y values alone.
Scientists are usually concerned with whether their regression
models improve predictive power. They therefore assess how good a
model is by determining the amount of predictive error that is eliminated by using the model. The measures generally used are the coefficient of determination (symbolized as r 2) and its square root, called
Pearson's correlationcoefficient (r).1 " The coefficient of determination
142.

The mathematical technique of "least squares" is so named because it picks out the lin-

ear model (prediction line) that has the least average squared error for the data presented. See
generally M. BLAND, supra note 106, at 191-95; J. COHEN & P. COHEN,. supra note 78, at 42-43,
50, 77; H. LOETHER & D. McTAvISH. supra note 37, at 247-50; L. SCHROEDER, D. SJOQUIsT & P.

supra note 135, at 17-23.
Two direct measures of this residual modeling uncertainty are the variance of residual

STEPHAN,

143.

error and the standard deviation of residual error. The variance of residual error is sometimes

referred to as the variance of residuals,and the standard deviation of residual error as the standard deviation of residuals. J. COHEN & P. COHEN, supra note 78, at 47-48. The varianbce of
residual error is the average of the squared differences between observed scores and predicted
scores, and the standard deviation of residual error is the square root of that average. See Id.
144. W. HAYS, supra note 91, at 554-60; H. LOETHER & D. McTAvjsH. supra note 37, at 25055; L. SCHROEDER. D. SIoQUIsT & P. STEPHAN, supra note 135, at 26; Finkelstein, supra note 7,
at 1448-53. The convention of the small roman letter r (instead of the Greek letter rho) is used in

this section to emphasize that this is a measure of residual error in observed data (such as a
sample or a completely enumerated population). Sampling error is logically distinct from model-
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is the proportion of average predictive error that is eliminated by using

the regression line instead of the mean of Y as a predictive rule.14 5
When r 2 = 1 (and hence r = 1), the dependent variable is perfectly
predicted by the independent variable: all the actual values of Y fall
squarely on the regression line, and there is no residual modeling error.
When r2 = 0 (and hence r = 0), there is no linear relationship at all
between the variables, and the regression line is no better as a predictive rule than is the mean of Y. In such a situation, the linear regression model has no predictive value at all. As r2 and r take on values
from 0 to 1, they indicate increased correlation between the variables
and decreased predictive error."4 Thus, r2 and r are commonly used to
characterize the strength of the linear association between two

variables. 47
ing error, see supra note 135, and is being ignored in this discussion of modeling error.
The correlation coefficient is different from, but related to, the regression coefficient. The
correlation coefficient is a symmetrical measure of association between the two variables, while the
regression coefficient is asymmetrical because it predicts the dependent variable using the independent variable. The value of the correlation coefficient would be identical to that of a regression
coefficient calculated for standardized scores of the two variables. See. e.g., W. HAYS, supra note
91, at 554-58; H. LOETHER & D. McTAv1SH. supra note 37, at 255-59; L SCMROEDEt. D SJO-

QUiST & P. STEPHAN, supra note 135, at 28-29; Godfrey, supra note 131, at 181-88.
145. The average amount of predictive error that is associated with using the mean of Y as
the predictor for any Yi is the variance of Y. The variance of Y is the average of the squared
differences between the actual score for each instance (Y) and the mean of Y. This method of
characterizing residual error for the mean of Y as a predictor uses the same measure of error as
the regression line-namely, average squared difference. See supra text accompanying notes 14142; see, e.g., H. LOETHER & D. McTAvtsH. supra note 37, at 247.49.
The ratio of the residual modeling error for the regression line to the variance of Y, therefore,
is a useful measure of the predictive success of the model, for that ratio provides the proportion of
error that is not eliminated by using the regression line instead of the mean as a predictor. See J.
COHEN & P. COHEN, supra note 78, at 47-48 (referring to the square root of this ratio as the
"coefficient of alienation"; for standardized scores, this can be thought of as the "ceefficient of
noncorrelation").
The coefficient of determination, r2, is therefore an indirect measure of residual modeling
uncertainty in the sense that, instead of measuring residual error directly, it measures the proportion of Y's variance that is eliminated using the regression equation, or the proportion of Y's
variance that is linearly associated with X. See generally J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78.
at 34-36, 46-48; H. LOaTHER & D. McTAv1SH. supra note 37, at 250-55; L SCHROEDER. D
SJOQUIST & P. STEPHAN, supra note 135, at 23-29.

146. A correlation coefficient r that is derived for a sample data set should be subjected to
significance testing or should have a confidence interval constructed if the conclusion to be
reached is about the degree of correlation in the population. See, e.g., J, COHEN & P. COHEN.
supra note 78, at 51-59, 62-65 (significance testing and confidence intervals for r1 and r); Finkelstein, supra note 7, at 1449-53; Fisher, supra note 7, at 716-20. This fact emphasizes the logically
distinct natures of sampling and modeling uncertainties.
147. The correlation coefficient has already been encountered in earlier discussions in this Article, although we were not then in a position to draw attention to it. In the case of criterion
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At the beginning of this section, I suggested two fundamental
ways to generate modeling error: the wrong choice of function form
and the wrong choice of constants. Identifying the best-fitting linear
regression line minimizes only the latter source of error, by selecting
the best constants (A and B) for the linear equation. 148 But uncertainty
is also created by the decision to use a straight line algebraic form as a
predictive rule instead of using a nonlinear model. Perhaps the selection
of a burved line would result in even less predictive error than the use
of even the best-fitting straight line.14 9 Thus, although the least squares
technique can be used to select the linear model with the least residual
modeling error, some nonlinear mathematical model might produce an
even better fit for the data. 150 Of course, each mathematical model,
whether linear or nonlinear, will contain its own mathematical assumptions and constants and will thus create its own potential for modeling
1 1
error.
B.

Multiple Linear Regression

Agencies and courts have been increasingly confronted with
multiple regression models, in which the dependent variable is related
mathematically to more than one independent variable.1 52 These models introduce modeling uncertainty in a way similar to bivariate models,' 53 but are more difficult to depict geometrically because the addivalidity of measurement, supra text accompanying notes 67-70, the validity coefficient is the correlation coefficient for the criterion measurements and the measurements taken using the method
being evaluated. See E. CARMINES & R. ZELLER. supra note 34, at 17-18; E. GHISELLI. J. CAMPBELL & S. ZEDICK, supra note 37, at 269; supra note 67. For an example of the use of regression
analysis in comparing a test method of chemical analysis to a reference method, see Peters &
Westgard, supra note 61, at 421-22.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
149. See, e.g., J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 63; H. LOETHER & D. McTAvIsI,
supra note 37, at 255.
150. If the values in a population are not linearly related, the value of r will be near zero. This
means only that the best-fitting linearmodel is not a very good predictor, compared to the mean
of the dependent variable. A low r value, however, supplies no information about the goodness of
fit of nonlinear models. See H. LoETHER & D. McTAvISH. supra note 37, at 255.
151. Sometimes an independent variable is not itself linearly related to the dependent variable,
but a mathematical transformation of the independent variable is. See, e.g., J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 76, 253-71. In such a case, a linear model could use as a variable the
transform of the original variable, and this might reduce residual modeling error.
152. See sources cited supra note 132; see also McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 352-80,
403 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd sub nom. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11 th Cir. 1985), afd,
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
153. Other assumptions associated with multiple linear regression models, such as additivity
and perfect collinearity, see W. BERRY & S. FELDMAN, supra note 130, at 37-38, 51-53, will not
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tion of each independent variable amounts to the addition of a new
dimension and a new axis to the geometric model. Thus, while a bivariate model can be depicted by a two-dimensional figure (such as Figure
1 supra), a model with three variables (1 dependent, 2 independent)
requires three-dimensional geometry.""
In a multiple regression model, each independent variable has its
own regression coefficient relating its effect on the predicted value of Y.
Such partialregression coefficients are measures of their associated independent variable's direct effect on the predicted value of Y, after the
effects of all the other independent variables have been taken into account, The partial regression coefficient for an independent variable
gives the incremental effect of that variable, after the other independent variables in the model have been statistically "held constant."'61
Similar to the situation with bivariate linear regression models, the
amount of residual predictive uncertainty associated with the choice of
a multiple linear model can be minimized through the use of the least
squares technique. The multiple regression equation is that particular
linear model that minimizes the overall modeling error.' The resulting
set of predicted values for Y will be as close as possible to the real
values of Y, given the restriction that the model must be linear--that is,
that the independent variables are each to be given a single, constant
weight.
be discussed here. The purpose of this Article is not to explore the intricacies of regression models.

but rather to explain and illustrate the nature of modeling uncertainty.
154. J. NETER. W. VASSERMAN & M. KUTNER. APPLIED LINEAR STATISTICAL
28 (3d ed. 1990). The general form for a multiple linear regression model is:
-

o

A

+ B,(XI? +...

MODELS

226-

B,(X)

where Yi is the predicted value of Y for instance i, X, through Xk are k independent variables and
Xki is the value of variable Xk for the instance i; A is the Y-intercept or regression constant, and
B, through Bk are called the "partial regression coefficients" for the independent variables. J
COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 81-83; W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 608-15. 621-23. The
meaning of the regression constant here is similar to that in the bivariate model: A is the value of
Y'when the value of each independent variable is zero. A partial regression coefficient. B,. is the
(constant) increase in Y for a unit increase in the independent variable X,. when the values of all
the other independent variables are held constant. J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 83-84.
98-100; W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 608-09. Thus, the assumption of linearity isstill a condition of
the multiple regression model in the sense that each independent variable is still linearly related to
the dependent variable. See W. BERRY & S. FELwDN, supra note 130, at 51.
155. J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 82-85, 91-92. Thus, where the hypothesis under
investigation is the incremental effect of regulation on highway fatalities, the primary interest is in
the estimated partial regression coefficient of the regulation variable in the regression model. Graham & Garber, supra note 132, at 217.
156. See J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 83; W. HAYS. supra note 91, at 621-26.
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The multiple correlation coefficient, R, is a common measure of
the linear association between the dependent variable Y and the multiple independent variables taken as a group.1 57 When R = 0, there is
no linear relationship between Y and the group of independent variables; when R = 1, there is a perfect linear relationship. 15 8 R therefore
provides an indirect measure of the residual modeling error for the
multiple linear regression model as a whole.1 59 Finally, just as with bivariate linear regression, the modeling error that is generated using a
multiple linear regression equation might be reduced or avoided if nonlinear functions were used instead.
VI.

CAUSAL UNCERTAINTY

Scientific information concerning causation is of fundamental importance to most social decisions. Prospective regulatory decisions are
effective and efficient to the extent that we correctly anticipate their
effects.160 Retrospective tort adjudications, whether sounding in negligence or strict liability, depend upon proof of causation. Prima facie
cases establishing employment discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 must include a showing of causation between
employment practices and statistical imbalances in the composition of
work forces.1 61 The conceptual problems associated with causation in
the law, however, are notoriously difficult and persistent.16 2 While this
Article does not undertake a philosophical analysis of causality, some
appreciation of the nature of the causal relationship is necessary in order to understand causal uncertainty and how specifying a causal system differs from positing a mathematical model. My objective is to illustrate how an assertion of causation goes beyond mathematical
157. J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 86-88.
158. For R = 0, the model predicts Y no better than the mean of Y does; when R - 1, there
is no residual modeling error (Y = '). See id.; H. LOETHER & D. McTAVISH, supra note 37, at
344-45.
159. Also in parallel with bivariate regression, R 2 is the proportion of the variance of Y that is
eliminated through the use of the regression equation as a predictive rule, while I - R2 is the
proportion of modeling uncertainty remaining with use of the model. See J. COHEN & P. COHEN.
supra note 78, at 86-88, 100; W. HAYS, supra note 91, at 630-33; H. LOETHER & D. McTAVIStH,
supra note 37, at 344-45.
160. See, e.g., Graham & Garber, supra note 132 (critiquing a major study that suggested
that automobile safety standards had failed to save lives).
161. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989).
162. See, e.g., W. KEETON. D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984) (perhaps nothing "in the entire field of law" has
generated more disagreement than the nature of the "reasonable connection" that must be found
in torts between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage suffered by the plaintiff).
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modeling, and how such an assertion creates causal uncertainty, which
is distinct from and incremental to the kinds of uncertainty so far
considered.
Like the mathematical models discussed in the preceding section,
causal analyses connect variables to each other. In a causal analysis,
however, the relationship between variables is not (merely) a mathematical function, but rather a causal relationship. Whereas mathematical models allow us to predict how variables will behave, only causal
analyses provide an explanation for how a system of variables works,
why a system works the way it does, or why it makes sense to think of
certain variables as "a system" at all. To understand how causal analyses differ from mere mathematical modeling, we must identify those
distinctive characteristics of the causal relationship that are commonly
accepted by scientists.
First, there is probably universal agreement among scientists that
mere statistical correlation between two variables does not entail causation between the variables.1 8 In the terminology of regression analysis,
we can say that even if the dependent variable Y and the independent
variable X are highly correlated, it does not necessarily follow that X
causes Y." Put simply, correlation does not entail causation.
There is, however, a logical relationship between statistical correlation and causation.1"' One of the principal reasons we are interested
in causal analysis is so that we can predict how groups of variables will
continue to function beyond the sample studied-beyond the number of
163. E.g., J. DAVIS. THE LoGic OF CAUSAL ORDER 10 (1985); D. KENNY. CORRELATION AND
CAUSALITY 1-4 (1979); Statistical Decision Theory, supra note S,at 375. Juries are sometimes
instructed that the fact that one event follows another, standing alone, is not evidence of causation. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Products Liability Litigation, 624 F. Supp.
1212, 1267 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (Appendix D, Jury Instructions).
164. Talking about causation between variables might appear odd to decisionmakers, who are
more accustomed to speaking of causation between events, not variables. For example, being exposed to a virus might be the event that makes a person become ill. But it is a short step from that
locution to saying that some key feature of the first event (such as the virus) "causes" some
feature of the second event. For example, we say that the virus causes the particular kind of
illness. In the terminology of variables, the proposition about causation could be recast using qualitative variables (for example, being exposed to the virus or not, having the particular kind of

illness or not), or quantitative variables when possible (such as duration or intensity of exposure or
illness). Using such variables, scientists can study different aspects of the causal relationship be-

tween exposure to the virus and becoming ill. There is, therefore, a derivative but useful sense in
which one variable "causes" another variable.
165. See J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 15 (analysis of causation can only proceed
through analysis of correlation and regression). For a discussion of the Henle-Koch-Evans Postu-

lates used in epidemiology to make an inference from statistical associations to biological causation, see Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 10, at 762-64.
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instances studied, beyond the measurement range studied, or beyond
the time frame for which we have data. So a first condition of a causal
relationship is normal concomitant change between cause and effect.160
That is, a change in the level of the causing variable (usually the mean
or proportion for that variable) is normally associated with a concomitant change in the level of the effect variable, unless a causal explanation is available to account for the lack of concomitant change. 16 For
example, if exposure to alternating magnetic fields causes childhood
leukemia, we would expect to find some association between exposure
and leukemia (such as an increase in the number of leukemia cases as
the duration of exposure increases) unless a causal explanation is available for why, in particular cases, such an association was not observed.
A second characteristic of a causal relationship is that the cause
must precede the effect in time. 8 The move from mere prediction to
causation, therefore, requires the specification of causal direction between the two variables, as well as the specification of whether the
causal action occurs directly between the variables or is wholly or partially mediated by one or more other variables.1 69 One current technique for analyzing a causal system is path analysis, in which causal
action is symbolized by arrows between variables, and causal "paths"
can be traced involving multiple variables. 170 For a schematic example,
see Figure 3.

166. See, e.g., D. KENNY, supra note 163, at 2-4; J.S. MILL. A SYSTEM OF LoGIc, Book III,
ch. VIII, § 6, at 466-70 (1843) (method of concomitant variation); Finkelstein, supra note 7, at
1449 n.27.
167. J. DAVIS, supra note 163, at 22.
168. J. DAVIS, supra note 163, at 11; D. KENNY, supra note 163, at 2-3. See also D. HUME, A
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, Book I, Part III, Section XV (1738) (Rule 2 for determining
cause-and-effect: "The cause must be prior to the effect.").
169. See J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 92-97; J. DAVIS, supra note 163, at 9-24.
170. J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 356-60. See generally id. at 353-78; J. DAVIS,
supra note 163; D. KENNY, supra note 163.
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supra note 78, at 357.

The type of causal model in Figure 3 might be relevant in an employment discrimination suit against a university over the effect of a
faculty member's sex upon his or her salary. The lower-case letters "f"
through "o" denote the direct causal effects of one variable upon another (in the direction of the arrow). In this system of variables, the
estimate of the direct incremental effect of sex upon salary ( E ) is the
partial regression coefficient for sex as an independent variable, when
salary is regressed on the variables sex, time since Ph.D., number of
publications, and number of citations to the faculty member's work in
the scientific literature in the previous year. The partial regression coefficient estimates the incremental effect of sex on salary after these
other independent variables have been accounted for. Of course, the
total effect of sex upon salary is the sum of its direct effect and its
indirect effects on salary via the other variables (e.g., sex I)publications
I) salary, or sex i) time since Ph.D. t publications I) salary). Thus, path
analysis uses regression analysis to clarify the causal relationships behind the regression model.
A third characteristic of causal assertions is that they are by nature universal: they must be about a relationship obtaining in the popu-
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lation, not merely in samples. If it is true that one variable has a causal
effect on another variable, then this relationship must hold between any
instances of those two variables, regardless of where or when those instances occur. It does not make sense to assert that a causal relationship has been observed, but that it might be the result of random sampling itself.17 1 Causal statements are essentially universal statements,
and while sampling can make correlations actually appear in a given
sample when no corresponding correlation exists in the population,
sampling cannot be said to create causal relationships within the data.
These three related characteristics of causal assertions virtually
ensure that assertions of causation can never be conclusively demonstrated to be true. Causal assertions entail the potential for causal error
in a radical and ineliminable way. Whenever scientists assert that A
causes B, that assertion necessarily has associated with it causal uncertainty. Of course, any evidence of a statistical correlation upon which
the causal assertion may be based also carries with it sampling, modeling, measurement, and conceptual uncertainty. The move to draw
causal conclusions, however, adds causal uncertainty to these other four
172
kinds of uncertainty.
Causal uncertainty is a kind of uncertainty peculiar to assertions
about causal relationships, as opposed to merely predictive assertions.
Thus, when we reach conclusions not just about how a system of variables happens to behave, but also about why it behaves the way that it
does, we create causal uncertainty. Causal uncertainty is the incremental potential for error about the existence, direction, or strength of the
causal relationship itself. In this section, I first examine several common sources of causal error, and then discuss several techniques that
scientists have developed to reduce the amount of causal error.
171. Statistical associations, of course, can be observed in a random sample alone, as a result
of chance, and such a result would be due to the sampling process itself. That is, the sample that
happened to be drawn contains a correlation, although the population from which the sample was

drawn does not. Thus, it makes perfectly good sense to say that a correlation is observed in a
sample that might turn out not to exist in the population. By contrast, we seem to be saying

something meaningless or contradictory if we assert that a causal relationship in fact exists by
chance in a random sample, but not in the population. If the causal assertion is not true universally, in the population of all instances, then it is simply not true at all.
172. Cf. W. BERRY & S. FELDMAN, supra note 130, at 26-37 (discussing effect of measurement error upon well-specified regression models).
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A. Sources of Causal Uncertainty
A common source of causal error is drawing causal inferences on
the basis of causally spurious correlations.173 This occurs when we observe a statistically significant correlation between variables A and B
and conclude incorrectly that A causes B.' 74 This conclusion might be
incorrect for several reasons. First, because correlation coefficients between two variables are bidirectional or symmetrical, 75 a causal inference might be wrong because we have determined the direction of the
causal action incorrectly. We may have mistaken the effect for the
76
cause.
A correlation between two variables might also be causally spurious because it is the result of a third variable acting on each of two
correlated variables, rather than causal action between those two variables.1 7 For example, in Figure 3 above, a high bivariate correlation
between number of publications and salary might be largely spurious,
because time since Ph.D. might have a substantial effect upon both
publications and salary.' 7 8 In such a case, the observed correlation is
actually brought about by the third variable (or by multiple other variables). The correlation is causally spurious to the extent that it does not
manifest a causal relationship between the correlated variables.
We can also incur causal error by concluding incorrectly that no
causal relationship exists between two variables because we observe no
correlation between them. Even when we see no statistical correlation
between two variables, or only a weak correlation, the two variables
might still be causally related. This situation can result when a suppressor variable reduces or eliminates the observable effect of the
causal variable, thus masking its causal action.17 0 If two variables work
in opposite directions on a third variable, one tending to increase the
third variable's value and the other tending to decrease it, then the
observed value of the affected variable might show little or no correla173.

J. DAVIS, supra note 163, at 25; D. KENNY, supra note 163. at 4.

174. Of course, an observed correlation might be merely a sampling effect. I assume here, for
sake of analysis, that sampling uncertainty is not an issue. Similarly, it is assumed in this section
that there is no modeling uncertainty.
175. See supra note 144.
176. See J. DAVIS, supra note 163, at 25.
177. See id. at 25-27.
178. J. COHEN & P. COHEN. supra note 78, at 359. For an illustrative example of investigating
alternative hypotheses to determine whether observed correlations are spurious, sec Graham &
Garber, supra note 132.
179. J. DAvis, supra note 163, at 33.
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tion with either one or both of the causing variables. Yet a conclusion
that no causal relationship exists between the variables would be causal
1 80

error.

A third important source of causal error is premature closure: the
decision not to consider more variables than those included in the analysis or model." 8' We cannot simply assume that the inclusion of additional variables would not affect the correlations we are observing. An
additional variable might show that some already observed correlation
is causally spurious; the addition of a suppressor variable might change
our interpretation of an otherwise weak relationship.182 In a multiple
regression model, the values of the partial correlation coefficients are
always relative to the set of independent variables actually included in
the model, with the result that those values might change whenever
new independent variables are added."8 3 Thus, whenever we close the
set of variables that are under consideration as causal factors, it is possible that we have left out some causally relevant variable. 8 4 Our principal justification for considering only certain variables and not others
must always be theoretical-that is, based upon some theory about the
180. Cf. id. at 57-59 (path analysis works equally well with positive or negative coefficients).
181. See id. at 35, 65-66 (absent variable "might do anything" if added to the model).
Too often researchers examine the simple, or raw, correlation coefficient as an indication
of causal effects. The naive logic is that if X causes Y, then X and Y should be correlated, and if X does not cause Y, they should be uncorrelated. Neither statement is true.
After controlling for other exogenous [i.e., causal or independent] variables, a strong relationship can vanish and a zero relationship can become strong.
D. KENNY, supra note 163, at 62.
The results of deleting relevant variables are potentially serious to the model. See, e.g.,
W. BERRY & S. FELDMAN, supra note 130, at 20-25.
182. See J. DAvis, supra note 163, at 66.
183. See supra note 181.
184. In multiple regression models, error due to premature closure is referred to as "specification error." See W. BERRY & S. FELDMAN, supra note 130, at 20-25; Fisher, supra note 7, at 70809; Graham & Garber, supra note 132, at 211-12. See also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385,
397-404 (1986) (while omission of variables from a regression analysis may render analysis less
probative, analysis which accounts for "major factors" normally admissible in Title VII pattern
and practice case).
Another kind of specification error is putting irrelevant variables into the multiple regression
model, see W. BERRY & S. FELDMAN, supra note 130, at 18-20; this second kind of specification
error can be a source of causal error as well. While the predictive error that results might be
minimal, the variable's presence can be more misleading in a causal sense if, through sampling
error, we happen to draw a sample in which the causally irrelevant variable generates a statistically significant coefficient and we therefore conclude that we have a causally relevant variable.
This kind of specification error can thus combine with sampling error to produce a causally spurious correlation within the model.
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causal structure of the system under study.18 5
B.

Techniques for Reducing Causal Uncertainty
Scientists routinely use methods that assist them in reducing the
risk of causal error. One of the most traditional techniques is to control
the values of causally relevant variables that are not under study.18 0
The most basic kind of control consists of keeping the values of the
controlled variables constant while the effects of some other variable
are being studied. This kind of control can sometimes be accomplished
in a laboratory, where such variables as air temperature or diet can be
manipulated. Another approach, especially in a laboratory setting, is to
employ a "control group": a group of animals, for example, that are as
nearly identical to the test animals as possible and are subjected to all
the same conditions as the test animals with the exception of the intervention or treatment whose effects are being studied.187 In principle, if
a perfect control group were achievable, any changes observed in the
test group that did not occur in the control group could be safely attributed to the difference between the groups-namely, to the variable
under study.""8
When a variable or group cannot be manipulated directly, however, statisticalcontrol of a variable can be achieved by monitoring the
variable throughout the study and then taking it into account within
the mathematical model used. In multiple regression modeling, independent variables can be regarded as statistical controls relative to the
other independent variables.18 9 Various statistical techniques are used
to take control data into account, such as standardization of data 0 ° or
replication within control categories.19 ' Regardless of the technique,
185. In a particular case, the only way to test for misspecification might be to evaluate the
predictive model by testing alternative models, with more or fewer variables. See W BERRY & S
FELDMAN, supra note 130, at 25-26.
186. See, e.g., J.S. MILL, supra note 166, Book Ill, ch. VIII, §§ 2-3, at 454-60; P. SPECTOR.
RESEARCH DESIGNS 15-16 (1981).
187. For a discussion of the benefits of a control group, see D. CAMPBEu. & Jo STANLEY.
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 13-16 (1963).
188. Error can be introduced in this experimental design not only by control failure (which

could lead directly to causal error), but also by errors in measurement, sampling, or modeling.
The present discussion is focused only on causal error.
189. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 708-15; supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
190. See, e.g., M. BLAND. supra note 106, at 299-302 (giving example of direct and indirect
methods of age standardization of mortality rates to eliminate effects of different age structures in

populations to be compared).
191. E.g., J. DAvIS, supra note 163, at 36 (repeating analyses or duplicating experiments separately among men and among women to eliminate effects due to sex).
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however, the objective is the same: to avoid causally spurious correlations, or to quantify the causally spurious portions of correlations between variables so that what remains has a greater chance of having
192
causal significance.
A second traditional technique, randomization, has an objective
similar to that of control: it is intended to eliminate causally spurious
correlations. 19a When we randomly sort cases or subjects into two or
more groups, we are trying to eliminate all but chance differences between the groups.194 In randomizing the cases, we are trying to eliminate all causal influences on the sorting itself, and thus eliminate all
causally significant differences between the groups. After true
randomization, the only differences that should be observable between
the groups are those arising by chance in the sorting process and those
due to differences to which the groups are subjected after sorting.
Therefore, control and randomization are powerfully combined in a
laboratory study design in which subjects are randomly assigned to the
control and test groups.

The concept of randomization is already familiar from the notion
of a simple random sample.19 5 When a true random sample is drawn
from a population, the members of the population are randomly divided
into two groups: the sample group and the rest of the population. To

the extent that we achieve a truly random sample, there should be no
correlations within the sample that differ from those in the population
except for those that have arisen by chance in the process of sam192. See J. DAvIs, supra note 163, at 36. Multiple regression models are used to achieve this
result by. generating partial regression coefficients for the independent variables. See supra text
accompanying notes 154-55. A partial regression coefficient characterizes the change in the predicted value of the dependent variable as a function of an independent variable, but only after
taking into account the functional effects on the dependent variable of all the other independent
variables in the model.
193. See. e.g., J. COHEN & P. COHEN, supra note 78, at 13; J. DAvis, supra note 163, at 3435; D. KENNY, supra note 163, at 184-87.
194. See, e.g., M. BLAND. supra note 106, at 8-13, 22-23 (randomization is only generally
satisfactory method of allocating subjects to treatment groups so that characteristics of subjects
do not affect chance of being put into any particular group); D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra
note 187, at 6 (random assignment to separate treatment groups is "all-purpose procedure for
achieving pretreatment equality of groups, within known statistical limits"); Black & Lilienfcld,
supra note 10, at 756 (in epidemiologic studies known as "clinical trials," purpose of randomized
assignment of individuals to exposed and nonexposed groups is to "ensure" that only difference
between groups is in the exposure); Lavori, Louis, Bailar & Polansky, Designs for Experiments-ParallelComparisons of Treatment, in MEDICAL USES OF STATISTICS, supra note 106, at
41, 43-50 (discussing benefits of randomization in clinical trials of medical treatments).
195. See supra text accompanying note 96.

1991]

THE SIREN SONGS OF SCIENCE

pling.'9 8 Random sampling highlights the additional power of
randomization: if we are able to randomize our cases, we do not need to
control (or even know the identity of) those variables being prevented
from producing spurious correlations.19 7 If we can randomize, we hope
to sever all causally significant differences between the groups and thus
eliminate the potential for an observed correlation to be causally spurious except by chance.1 98

While these traditional techniques help to reduce the potential for
causal error, the problem of premature closure guarantees that causal
conclusions are never free of causal uncertainty.19 9 In the end, despite
the use of helpful statistical techniques and favorable research designs,
scientists must rely upon adequate scientific theory and comprehensive
empirical study to minimize causal uncertainty.
The task of characterizing residual causal uncertainty has not
been addressed systematically and comprehensively. Scientists can help

decisionmakers to appreciate the extent of residual causal uncertainty
by explaining the theoretical weaknesses behind key causal conclusions

and by reporting on empirical investigations that have led scientists to
conclude that additional variables are causally irrelevant. In addition,
regulatory agencies sometimes attempt to develop a scale or index for

evaluating the strength of evidence for causal conclusions. 00 It seems,
196. M. BLAND. supra note 106, at 8-14, 33-34.
197. J. DAVIS, supra note 163, at 35.
198. Besides the traditional techniques of control and randomization, various other techniques
have been developed that can help to reduce causal uncertainty. Such techniques include elaboration and effects analysis. For a discussion of these techniques, see J. DAVIS, supra note 163. at 3948. Path analysis is also a powerful means of identifying potential causal error. See supra text
accompanying notes 169-70. While the first two techniques are applicable to any measure of statistical association (not just correlation), path analysis is limited to such specific statistical techniques as multiple regression and weighted regression with proportion or percentage differences.
J. DAvis, supra note 163, at 48, 59.
199. Conceptual uncertainty is also a significant factor, for to the extent that scientists are
able to reconceptualize phenomena and redefine their variables, see supra text accompanying
notes 47-49, they have the potential to reconceptualize causal theories as well. If scientists are
dissatisfied with the extent of residual causal uncertainty, they may be led to redesign the concepts
and variables employed in their theories. Thus, although conceptual uncertainty is logically distinct from causal uncertainty, there is a logical relation, and sometimes an important dynamic
interplay, between these two kinds of uncertainty. Cf. Finkelstein, supra note 7, at 1446 (discussing example of determining cost of equity by means of a regression model, and the need for an
underlying theory to support the argument that variability of earnings is an appropriate measure
of risk and that risk is a relevant factor for adjusting the cost of equity).
200. For example, the EPA has developed a classification system for categorizing the weight
of evidence for an environmental agent's capability of causing cancer in humans. See Guidelines
for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,999-34,000 (EPA 1986).
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however, that no systematic, comprehensive, and standard scheme has
been developed that can be used to help the decisionmaker appreciate
the true potential for causal error in the information being relied upon.
VII.

EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY

I have discussed how descriptive scientific information has associated with it the potential for error in the selection of concepts and variables, in measurement, sampling, modeling, and the drawing of causal
conclusions. Such uncertainties attach to the truth of even the simplest
causal assertions made by scientists. The final kind of uncertainty that
I will discuss, which I call "epistemic uncertainty," is in some ways
even more fundamental than these five kinds of uncertainty, because it
involves the potential for error in our thinking about the nature or
structure of empirical knowledge itself. Epistemic uncertainty can arise
from our selection of theories in such fundamental areas as deductive
logic 20 1 or basic mathematics. Such error in our epistemological theories can infect all of our descriptive information about the world.
An extended example should help to clarify what I mean by epistemic uncertainty. The example is the controversy surrounding the
meaning of probability assertions about events in the world: assertions
that some event is "probable" or that the probability of some event's
happening is 1/x. Such assertions play critical roles in social decisionmaking, whether the task is tort adjudication 20 2 or administrative
rulemaking. 0 Scientists are divided, however, on the meaning of such
201. For example, such uncertainties include whether the deductive logic used should model
valid inference on a propositional level (propositional logic) or predication level (predicate or
quantified logic), or whether modal operators (representing, for example, logical necessity or logical impossibility) should be available within the logic. See generally I. Copl, supra note 30. 0.
HUGHES & M. CRESSWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODAL LOGIC (1968). Today, such decisions
are reaching the practical level of decisionmaking through the construction of "expert systems,"
for which a deductive logic must be chosen as part of the "inference engine." See R. SUSSKIND.
EXPERT SYSTEMS IN LAW 10 (1987) ("inference engine" is the mechanism by which the knowledge base interacts and reasons with the data relating to any problem at hand). The choice of
which deductive logic to use can in turn affect the kinds of inferences derivable within the expert
system. See id. at 163-69 (inference engine of expert system necessarily implements some formal
logical system, whether "traditional" syllogistic logic, "classical" propositional and predicate logics, deontic logic, modal logic, fuzzy logic, or many-valued logic).
202. The classic formula inserting probability into issues of negligence is the statement by
Judge Learned Hand that due care is a function of the probability that resulting injury will occur.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293 (b) & Comment b (1965) (in determining magnitude of risk for purposes of
determining negligence, extent of chance that conduct will cause harm is important factor).
203. See, e.g., Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed, Reg. 33,992 (1986) (ad-
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statements, and, as will be seen, the choice of which theory of meaning
to adopt can have significant implications for decisionmakers.
The classical interpretation of a probability assertion is that it is a
statement about the relative frequency of occurrence of some type of
event in the long run. ° ' When we say, for example, that the
probability of throwing a "2" with a fair die is 1/6, we mean (according to the classical theory) that in the long run, the most likely frequency for throwing a "2" is 1 time per 6 throws. This classical interpretation of probability statements was used explicitly in the discussion
of sampling uncertainty above,20 5 in the context of both significance
testing and confidence interval construction. In classical significance
testing, we use probability theory to derive the probability of drawing a
particular type of sample from the (hypothetical) population. When we
construct confidence intervals, we use probability theory to determine
the size of the interval estimate that has the desired probability of including the true population value. In either case, a statement of
probability is critical to the reasoning.
When we explain significance testing and confidence intervals using the classical interpretation of probability, we say that, in a
probability distribution of sample proportions, the sample proportion
with the highest probability is the sample we expect to be the most
frequently drawn in the long run. 20 6 Under this classical interpretation,
the probability being asserted is really the expected frequency of drawing a particular type of sample, but the probability statement is not
about the identity of the true population proportion (the parameter being estimated). 0 7 The true proportion is unknown, but it is some definite number. The probability statement is not about the likelihood that
the population has a given proportion, but rather about the likelihood
of drawing possible samples from a population.203
dressing generically the importance of such issues as determining how likely it is that an environ-

mental agent is a human carcinogen, estimating the likely range of excess cancer risk associated
with given levels of exposure, and estimating the exposures to which populations are likely to be
subject); see also J. COHRSSEN & V. COVELLO, supra note 27, at 90-94 (discussing use of
probability distributions, confidence intervals, and other techniques to characterize uncertainty in
such variables as failure rates for equipment or census data on exposed populations, or in the use
of models for estimating dose-response or groundwater contamination).
204. See, e.g., G. IVERSEN. BAYESIAN STATISTICAL INFERENCE 8 (1984); supra notes 93, 97.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 93-127.

206. The long-run, relative frequencies for other possible samples or the same size arc distributed according to the binomial distribution. See supra note 99.
207. E.g.. supra note 113; see also G. IVERSEN, supra note 204, at 76.
208. See G. IVERSEN, supra note 204, at 76.
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Many scientists, however, believe that the classical interpretation
of a probability statement is of limited usefulness. First, they contend
that many ordinary probability assertions are not about the relative frequency of objectively observable events. Rather, the uncertainty expressed in our probability statements is a lack of confidence in the truth
of our beliefs, and probability statements are really measures of subjective uncertainty. 09 When we say that it will probably rain tomorrow,
we are conveying a measure of our confidence in the proposition that it
will rain tomorrow. We are not ordinarily asserting that more often
than not rain occurs (or would occur) on the day following meteorological circumstances sufficiently similar to those of today. The latter classical interpretation of our probability statement, therefore, does violence
to our ordinary meaning.
It is also argued that the relative frequency interpretation of
probability cannot deal adequately with unique events. Probability
statements should be meaningful when applied to unique events, without our having to conceptualize the unique event as somehow recurring
"inthe long run."210 The fact that lawsuits typically deal with unique
events may explain why probability theory (in the classical sense) has
had such limited usefulness in the law. 211 The classical interpretation of
probability is counterintuitive to many lawyers because it seems to require us to assess the relative frequency of outcomes in the complicated
circumstances of even the most bizarre accident. 2
A further argument against the classical interpretation is made in
the context of statistical sampling theory. What we know with a great
deal of confidence is the sample statistic (the data); what we are uncertain about is the population parameter, about which we are trying to
reach a justified belief based upon the sample. This leads to a result
precisely opposite to that of the classical viewpoint: probabilities should
be computed for the value of the parameter, not for the sample. The
sample itself has no probability attached to it.2 13
209. See id.at 9, 17, 66. Arbitrary and subjective elements are present within classical theory
as well, such as the choice of the level of significance for rejecting an hypothesis or the choice of a
level of confidence. See id. at 66-67; S. PRESS. BAYESIAN STATISTICS: PRINCIPLES. MODELS. AND
APPLICATIONS

45-46 (1989).

210. G. IVERSEN, supra note 204, at 9.
211. See Confidence in Probability, supra note 13, at 386-87, 391.
212. It seems counterintuitive that we decide that the accident of the famous Mrs. Palsgraf,
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), was improbable by
conducting a thought experiment and tallying the number of possible scenarios containing her

injury.
213.

G.

IVERSEN,

supra note 204, at 17, 76. For the classical interpretation, see supra note
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Finally, it is argued that classical statistical inference, based on
the classical interpretation of probability, is inadequate to the task of
measuring the change in our confidence in a conclusion as a result of
taking new information into account. 1 4 Scientists engage in ongoing
discovery and continually revise their tentative conclusions (for example, about the risks associated with exposure to alternating magnetic
fields) on the basis of new data. Therefore, an adequate theory of statistical inference should be able to accommodate our initial ("prior")
assessments of probability and should provide a means of adjusting that
probability assessment as empirical data accumulate.21 5 A subjective
interpretation of probability leads us to want to develop such a cumulative rule for probability. Classical significance testing, in contrast, tends
to treat each scientific study independently of prior studies and does not
normally take prior probabilities into account when subsequently acquired data are tested for significance.
For these reasons, a substantial number of scientists favor using an
alternative theory of statistical inference that is based upon a subjective
interpretation of probability.216 The leading alternative to the frequency-based classical theory is the theory of statistical inference based
upon Bayes' Theorem. 1 ' Bayes' Theorem provides a rule for combining
113.
214.

Another argument made against the classical interpretation is that a subjective interpre-

tation of probability is better able to avoid certain paradoxes of classical hypothesis testing or
confidence interval generation, such as the paradox of "stopping rules." It is argued that under

classical theory the statistical significance of a sampling result should be a function of the researcher's intention in deciding how to draw the sample. See G, IVERSEN. supra note 204. at 7374. This argument is technical in nature and does not add weight to the premise of this section.
which is simply that there are alternatives to the classical view of the meaning of probability that
have substantial adherence in the scientific community.
215. Id. at 11, 16. Legal commentators have also emphasized the need to determine how to
combine "hard" scientific information (such as the statistical results of a carefully conducted
study) with "soft" information (such as eyewitness testimony). See. e.g., Koehler & Shapiro.
supra note 11, at 265-78; Laws of Probability,supra note 1I; GatecrasherParadox.supra note
11, at 106-08; Comment, supra note I1; Trial by Mathematics, supra note II; Identification
Evidence, supra note 11; Kaplan, supra note 12. at 1083-91. Cf. Finkelstein, supra note 7, at
1455-75 (suggesting protocols for the use of regression models about economic effects in adminis-

trative proceedings, with the objective of moving subjective administrative considerations "back
from the ultimate conclusion into preliminary questions involved in constructing a model").
216. For legal commentators arguing the merits of subjective versus frequentist interpretations
of probability statements, see Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 13. at 137-48; Confidence in
Probability,supra note 13, at 390-93; Identification Evidence, supra note 1I,at 504-05; Kaplan,
supra note 12, at 1066-67; Paradoxes,supra note 13, at 641-45; GatecrasherParadox,supra note
11, at 104-06; Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 11, at 252-53;.
217. Bayes' Theorem is a fundamental theorem of the mathematical theory of probability.
See, e.g., Laws of Probability, supra note 11, at 41-53; Paradoxes. supra note 13, at 637-38

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:567

a "prior" probability distribution for a parameter with new data to
generate a "posterior" probability distribution, which in turn could become the new prior probability distribution for subsequent studies.
Bayes' Theorem, therefore, is used to take into account old estimates of

a population value plus new information,
in order to calculate revised
18
estimates for that population value.

As an example, consider the estimation of a proportion p within a
population. A Bayesian approach requires generating a prior
probability distribution for the possible values of p.219 This probability
(Bayes' Theorem does not presuppose subjective interpretation of probability, and holds for other
interpretations such as relative frequency or degree of confirmation). The theorem is often formulated as 'follows:
pr(X[E) = [Pr(ElX) pr(X),
[ pr(E) I
where pr(X) is the prior probability that some proposition X is true, pr(E IX) is the conditional
probability that some evidentiary proposition E is true given that X is true, pr(E) is the
probability that E is true regardless of whether X is true or not, and pr(X IE) is the conditional
probability that X is true given the truth of E. The unconditional probability that the evidence is
true, pr(E), can be expanded in terms of conditional probabilities:
pr(E) = [pr(EIX) pr(X)]+[pr(Elnon-X)pr(non-X)]
For derivations of the theorem, see Res Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 13, at 1468-71; Trial by
Mathematics, supra note 11, at 1351-53; IdentificationEvidence, supra note 11, at 498-99.
218. In recent years, there has been a vigorous debate among legal commentators over the
usefulness of either Bayes' Theorem or Bayesian statistics in legal decisionmaking. See Laws of
Probability,supra note 11; Kaplan, supra note 12. Those arguing for the usefulness of Bayesian
techniques include: Finkelstein & Fairley (in Comment, supra note 11, and Identification Evidence, supra note 11); Kaye (in Res Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 13); Koehler & Shaviro (in Verldlcal Verdicts, supra note 11); Kornstein (in A Bayesian Model of Harmless Error,supra note 13);
and Lempert (in Modeling Relevance, supra note 13).
Those arguing against at least certain uses of Bayesian techniques in a legal context include:
Brilmayer & Kornhauser (in Review: QuantitativeMethods and Legal Decisions, supra note 13,
at 130-48); Callen (in Notes on a Grand Illusion, supra note 11); L. Cohen (in Subjective
Probabilityand Logic of Proof,supra note 13); and Tribe (in Mathematical Proof and Trial by
Mathematics, supra note 11).
219. For use in the context of statistical inference, Bayes' Theorem could be used to relate the
probability that the population proportion for some variable has the value p to the fact that the
sample data has a proportion P, as follows:
pr(pldataP) =

pr(dataPp)pr(p)
[pr(dataP~p)pr(p)] [pr(daraPInon-p)pr(non-p)]

where pr(p) is the "prior" probability that the proportion in the population (the parameter) has
the value p (a probability derived prior to taking the subsequently acquired data with observed
proportion P into account); "dataP" is the proposition that the data has proportion P; pr(dataP Ip)
is the probability of drawing a sample with the observed proportion P given a population proportion p; non-p is the complement to p - that is, p and non-p are mutually exclusive and exhaustive
hypotheses about the population proportion; and pr(pldataP) is the probability of the population
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distribution for p might be based in a particular case upon empirically
rigorous data (such as the results of a large simple random sample),
less rigorous empirical data, anecdotal information, or theoretical considerations. 220 The probability distribution could be generated on the
basis of opinions of experts familiar with the relevant scientific field." 1
Whatever the appropriate method for generating such probability distributions (a matter of much dispute among even Bayesian theorists),222 the objective is to model, using a probability distribution, our
best estimates of the value of p prior to our taking the new data into
account. Once the prior probability distribution has been constructed,
Bayes' Theorem can be used to derive a posterior probability distribution on the basis of the prior distribution and the new data. Thus, the
use of prior probabilities allows us to take prior subjective knowledge
(from whatever source) into account, and the use of Bayesian methods
of calculation provides a means of combining that "captured" subjecbased on objective, quantive knowledge with a probability assessment
223
titative data from empirical studies.
Bayesian techniques can yield different results in significance testing and different confidence intervals than those generated with classical techniques. The introduction of prior probabilities into the calculation can cause the numerical limits of Bayesian confidence intervals, for
example, to diverge from classically generated ones; the degree of divergence depends upon the extent to which the prior distribution affects
the outcome. 24 In situations in which the prior probability has little
effect, the confidence intervals generated by Bayesian methods can be
numerically identical to the confidence intervals calculated using classiproportion's being p if the observed sample proportion is P. See G,IvEtSEN. supra note 204, at
12-16; supra note 217. This expression of Bayes' Theorem illustrates its direct application to the

problem of significance testing.
The appropriate use of Bayesian techniques in statistical inference is a matter of controversy
even among scientists. See, e.g., Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 135 n.68; Laws of
Probability, supra note 11, at 51 n.57.

220. See G. IVERSEN, supra note 204, at 62.
221. See, e.g., id. at 64-68; H. RAiFFA. DECISION ANALYSIS. INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON
CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY

104-28 (1968).

222. Discussions concern such issues as how best to model complete ignorance: whether, for
example, such states of "knowledge" should be modeled by using equal probabilities over the
range of possible values. See G. IVERSEN, supra note 204, at 61-62.

223. See supra note 215. For a detailed illustration of Bayesian techniques in combining blood
test data with other kinds of evidence to decide paternity cases, see Berry & Geisscr. supra note
87.

224. G.IVERSEN, supra note 204, at 30-31, 68-70.
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cal methods. 25 The use, therefore, of Bayesian statistics as an alternative to classical statistics can have importance at the level of practical
decisionmaking to the extent that the decision rests (for example) upon
the size of confidence intervals.
This example of confidence interval size also illustrates the fundamental and pervasive nature of epistemic uncertainty. The choice of
either classical or Bayesian theories of statistical inference can affect
the size of confidence intervals, which are useful measures of sampling
uncertainty. The selection of one theory of statistical inference or interpretation of probability over the other, therefore, is itself a source of
epistemic uncertainty. The extent of epistemic uncertainty, as opposed
to sampling uncertainty, might be gauged in a suitable case by constructing different confidence intervals using the competing interpretations of probability and statistical inference, and by noting the differ226
ence in the derived confidence intervals.
This brief discussion of Bayesian inferential statistics is intended
merely as an illustration of epistemic uncertainty. Because the nature
of epistemic uncertainty is likely to vary depending upon the source of
the uncertainty, both the means for reducing epistemic uncertainty and
the techniques for characterizing the extent of it also vary greatly. In
the case of classical versus Bayesian inferential statistics, for example,
the numerical difference in confidence intervals might be taken as a
rough measure of the epistemic uncertainty introduced by the choice of
one method over the other. Other instances of epistemic uncertainty
might not lend themselves to such neat resolution.
225. For example, in analyzing the mean from a normal distribution, if the new data are from
a large sample, then the prior probability distribution typically has little or no effect on the posterior probability distribution. Id. at 69.
226. A Bayesian theorist who bases prior probabilities upon purely subjective or intuitive bases, as opposed to empirically generated data, may introduce additional types of uncertainty beyond those discussed in this Article. The nature of such uncertainties depends upon the nature of
the information employed and upon the extent to which the taxonomy discussed here can be generalized beyond purely scientific information. I suspect, although I do not argue here, that this
taxonomy also captures most kinds of uncertainty present in any descriptive information, whether
"scientific" or not.
Perhaps one reason that non-Bayesians resist Bayesian analyses as "unscientific," see, e.g., S.
PRESS, supra note 209, at 45, is precisely because such analyses seem to have the potential for
contaminating scientific information (with its at least identifiable types of uncertainty) with
sources of potential error that are elusive, ill-defined, and resistant to meaningful measurement,
evaluation, or reduction.
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

This Article presents a taxonomic scheme for cataloging the distinct kinds of uncertainty associated with descriptive scientific information.227 I propose that these six kinds of uncertainty capture those principal sources of potential error in descriptive scientific information that
pose conceptual challenges to decisionmakers.2 28 I know of no way to
demonstrate that all important sources of error have been included,
and I put forward this taxonomy as a first approximation of a complete
understanding of the structure of scientific uncertainty.
This taxonomy, however, even if it proves to be incomplete, should
assist decisionmakers in understanding many important ways in which
descriptive scientific information can "go wrong." It should provide a
227.

The six kinds of uncertainty discussed in the previous sections or this Article are, it is

hoped, the major kinds of potential error associated with descriptive scientific information. In
addition to describing the world, however, some scientists have addressed decisionmaking itself
and have developed theories about how to make better decisions. Such theories include risk/benefit analysis, normative economic analysis, decision analysis, and game theory. See generally R.
LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (1957); H.
RAIFFA, supra note 221; Schotter & Schw~diauer, Economics and the Theory of Games: A Survey, 18 J.ECON. LITERATURE 479 (1980). A more recent area of growing regulatory importance is
"risk management," a part of the process of "risk assessment." See. e.g.. J, CoHRssEN & V.
COVELLO, supra note 27, at 8; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 43, at 3. 17-50. It
remains to be seen whether this latter area of study will produce any distinctive scientific theories
about decisionmaking.
What such theories have in common is that their conclusions are often cast in the language of
prescription, with normative overtones. See, e.g., GatecrasherParadox,supra note 11.
at 106 (use
of Bayes' Theorem as normative). Such theories arrive at reasoned conclusions about what we
ought to do, given our residual descriptive uncertainties. They lead to conclusions about what
factors ought to be taken into account in decisionmaking, what conditions or endstates ought to be
preferred, and what actions ought to be taken. They produce advice about how best to conduct our
social affairs in the face of our considerable uncertainty about how things work.
This Article does not analyze prescriptive scientific conclusions or the kinds of unique uncertainty that might be associated with such conclusions. One example of a source of prescriptive
uncertainty might be the assignment of utilities, preferences, or losses to various outcomes. See.
e.g., H. RAIFFA, supra note 221, at 51-103. Legal commentators have also been concerned with
such problems. See, e.g., Laws of Probability, supra note 11, at 53-56; Trial by Mathematics.
supra note 11, at 1378-93; Kaplan, supra note 12. If such scientific theories about decisionmaking
reduce to descriptive theories about the conditional consequences of human action, then the uncertainties associated with scientific prescriptions should reduce to one or more of the categories of
descriptive uncertainty discussed in this Article. I do not in this Article attempt such a reduction
or speculate about the outcome of such an attempt.
228. I have noted in passing the additional potential for error from mistaken computation.
human error, and fraud, supra note 20. In addition, with respect to Bayesian inferential statistics,
there seems to be an unexplored possibility for infusing error of a purely subjective sort, supra
note 226. In fact, any method of generating information or knowledge that is subjective in a
radical sense could have such error associated with it, and such error would not be ptculiar to
science.
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useful framework for analyzing the kinds of uncertainty inherent in scientific information. Those responsible for adjudicating guilt or liability,
or for making regulatory decisions that affect public health or safety or
the environment, need to appreciate precisely how the scientific information supporting their decisions might be in error. Armed with such
an understanding, decisionmakers should be better able to identify critical questions for their scientific witnesses and advisors, reduce critical
uncertainties to an acceptable level, appreciate the residual risks associated with decisions, and properly allocate to the parties the burden of
producing evidence. 229 As the planet becomes more populated, human
demands upon dwindling resources grow, and the relationships between
decisions and their effects become more complex, it is increasingly important to make decisions based upon the least amount of scientific uncertainty that the society as a whole can afford.

229. As Judge Bazelon noted: "Courts frequently grant the agency wide discretion in allocating the burden of uncertainty. This circumstance makes full disclosure of uncertainties as important as full disclosure of known risks." Bazelon, supra note 14, at 213. For an interesting step in
the direction of allocating burdens of proof based on sampling uncertainty, see Confidence in
Probability,supra note 13. There are more kinds of scientific uncertainty, however, than sampling
uncertainty.

